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Comments
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT: A NATIONAL SURVEY
INTRODUCTION

The determination and legal effect of prosecutorial misconduct in criminal cases is a problem which has plagued jurists for a number of years.
In the thirty-five years since the United States Supreme Court decided
Mooney v. Holohan,1 where the prosecution's deliberate deception of the
court and the jury through the knowing use of perjured testimony was held
to be a denial of due process of law, a number of cases have appeared
which attempted to further define and deliniate that decision. A progeny
of the Mooney decision, is Brady v. Maryland,2 which held suppression of
evidence by the prosecution is a denial of due process of law, regardless
of the negligence of the prosecution.
This comment attempts to catalogue the many cases involving prosecutorial misconduct as defined by Mooney and Brady. Six major problem areas have been selected, with attention given to both state and federal decisions of each federal appellate circuit and, where expressed, the
opinions of the United States Supreme Court. Certain problems arose
in the compilation of this survey, the major one being the proper placement and alignment of the various decisions. In many instances the nature of the particular case was such that it could have been properly
placed in any one of several categories. Thus, although a case might
be discussed under a particular topic, the reader should not feel precluded
from using the case as the basis for the presentation of a different legal
argument.
Another similar problem stemmed from the fact that the courts often
failed to differentiate between substantive and procedural law. The cases,
therefore, are necessarily a blend of the two, with no attempt made to
differentiate between substantive and procedural aspects. A final problem is that cases from the first and sixth circuits are at a premium, with the
result that, in some instances, opinions from those two circuits will not be
presented. Where there are no decisions from a certain circuit covering
one of the points, a notation will be made in the introduction to that topic.
1. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
2.

373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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The sections and the scope of the problems which will be covered within
each, are as follows:
Duties of the Prosecution. A review of affirmative duties placed upon the prosecution and other representatives of the people. Are there any instances where these
duties may be excused?
The Need for a Defendant's Request. A look at the courts' interpretation of the
Brady decision placing the duty of a formal request for information upon the defense before a denial of due process of law may be claimed.
What Must be Disclosed: Materiality and Discovery. A discussion of the types of
evidence which must be turned over to the defense, as well as what the defense is
not entitled to receive. Furthermore, a survey of the various discovery rules
throughout the several circuits.
Where the Defendant Already Has Knowledge of the Facts. A discussion of the
legal implications where the defendant has actual knowledge of facts which he
claims were suppressed. Also a look at the theory of implied knowledge attributed
to the defense.
Negligent Suppression by the Prosecution. When the prosecution has been remise in
its duties, what is the legal effect? Furthermore, what tests do the courts apply for
a determination of prosecutorial negligence?
Use of False Testimony or Evidence by the Prosecution. Rather than a suppression of facts favorable to the defendant, what is the effect of the prosecution
using false evidence to secure the conviction of the defendant? Are there any
cases in which the prosecution may be excused from penalty for the use of the false
evidence?

This work is not presented either as a defense or prosecution manual,
but rather as a guide for the jurist whose interest is justice and to assist in
further defining the relative rights and responsibilities of both the prosecution and the defense. It is for this purpose that this comment has been

prepared.
DUTIES OF THE PROSECUTION
INTRODUCTION
The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but
to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the secreting of witnesses
capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible.a

Ordinarily, when we speak of the duties of the prosecution, we tend
to think of the public official whose sole task is to make certain that
guilty parties pay their debts to society. However, as noted in the above
quoted Canon, the duties of the prosecution are far more extensive than
simply prosecuting the accused. As stated in the Canon, the primary
duty of the prosecutor is to see that justice is done. But just how is the
3. Canon Number 5, Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Ass'n.
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prosecutor to fulfill this duty? First, one must realize that the prosecution may not suppress evidence or intentionally deceive the court. But in
reference to these duties, many new questions arise. For example, what
percentage of its evidence must the prosecution put forth in the presentation of its case-all or just enough to convict? Is the prosecution under
an affirmative duty to seek out evidence which might exculpate the defendant? To whom is the prosecutor accountable and may he ever be
excused from his duty to present evidence favorable to the accused? Is
technical compliance with court standards enough or must the prosecutor
4
do more? These and similar questions will be examined in this section.
UNITED STATES SUPREME

COURT INTERPRETATIONS

In Brady v. United States,5 the defense requested the prosecution to
produce an extrajudicial statement made by Brady's accomplice in which
the accomplice admitted performing the homicide of which Brady was
convicted. As this statement might have had some effect on the jury that
determined the penalty, the statement was quite important to the defense;
however, the prosecutor, nevertheless, withheld the statement. The United
States Supreme Court held this to be reversible error, stating:
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process of law where the evidence is either material to guilt or punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prose-

cution. 6

Although Brady held that a suppression of evidence is a denial of due

be turned over
process, no criteria was set forth as to what actually must
7
to the defense and at what time it was necessary to do so.
An attempt to establish a specific requirement on the prosecution was
made in Giles v. State of Alaryland,8 where the state suppressed evidence

pointing to the sexual proclivities of the prosecutrix in a rape prosecution.
Although the Court refused to discuss the duty of the prosecution as to
the disclosure of evidence, Mr. Justice Fortas in a concurring opinion,
strongly related what he believed to be this duty:
A criminal trial is not a game in which the State's function is to outwit and entrap
its quarry. The State's pursuit is justice, not a victim. If it has in its exclusive
possession specific, concrete evidence which is not merely cumulative or embellish4.
5.
6.
7.

First circuit cases have not been presented in this section.
Supra note 2.
Supra note 2, at 87.
In later chapters, the Brady holding shall be discussed almost phrase by

phrase.
8.

386 U.S. 66 (1967).
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ing and which may exonerate the defendant or be of material importance to the
defense-regardless of whether it relates to testimony which the State has caused to
be given at the trial-the State is obliged to bring it to the attention of the court
and the defense. 9
INTERPRETATIONS WITHIN THE CIRCUITS

Second Circuit
In its decisions, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has pre-

sented seemingly opposite views as to the duties of the prosecution.

In

United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins,10 it was alleged that the State

suppressed the identity of two witnesses to the crime and in so doing denied Meers due process of law. The court cited Application of Kapatos, 11 quoting Judge Palmieri's opinion as to the duties of the prosecution:
The purpose of a trial is as much the acquittal of an innocent person as it is the
conviction of a guilty one. The average accused usually does not have the manpower or the resources available to the state in its investigation of the crime. Nor
does he have access to all of the evidence, much of which has usually been removed or obliterated by the time he learns that he is to be tried for the crime.
In view of this disparity between the investigating powers of the state and the defendant, I do not think it imposes too onerous a burden on the state to require it
to disclose the existence of a witness of the significance of Danise in the instant
case. At the very least, the trial judge should have been made aware of this evidence, and a ruling should have been requested by the prosecutor with respect to his
12
duty in the premises ....

The court then proceeded to rule that the suppression of the names of the
two witnesses by the prosecution amounted to a denial of due process of
law.

Later, in a district court decision (affirmed by the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit), United States ex rel. Fein v. Deegan,3 the court

ruled that the prosecution did not deny the defendant due process by fail-

ing to disclose the name and address of a possible witness in a murder
case. The district court first found that the defendant never really made
a formal request for the information and further stated that the witness
was unworthy of belief and could only have testified as to matters peripheral to the case. As to the prosecutorial duty, the'court stated:
There is no requirement that the prosecutor be the guardian of every possible
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 100.
326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964).
208 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
Id. at 888. Also cited at 326 F.2d 139-40.
298 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), affd 410 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1969).
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Even assuming that a defense re-

quest is not always necessary, not every lead or story need be turned over ....

14

The court further pursued the matter of the prosecution's accountability

to the defense, adding:
I find nothing improper in the prosecution's actions. Due process of law does not
require the prosecutor to hold himself accountable to the defense on peripheral
matters which he has good cause to believe are untrue, merely because they could
conceivably be of some help to the defense. .... 15

Third Circuit
Two cases in the third circuit considered the limitations on the prosecutor in withholding witnesses. In the first, United States ex rel. Brothers
v. Rundle,'6 the court found that the prosecution's failure to produce a

possible witness for the defense did not constitute a denial of due process.
The defendant was originally charged with sodomy and when the State
failed to produce a second boy who escaped the defendant's attack, the
defendant claimed a denial of due process. Finding that this boy's testimony would have been cumulative and of no use to the defense, the court,
stated, in dicta, that Pennsylvania law "does not require the prosecution
to produce all witnesses in a criminal case if the testimony is cumulative
or relates to background information." The court went on to hold:
It is not a requirement of due process that the prosecution search out and produce
every witness, and there is no violation if the prosecution 'merely fails to disclose
the evidence of which he has no knowledge or fails simply to use or disclose evidence which is vague, inconclusive, and cumulative ....

17

In a second case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania required the
prosecution to make available an F.B.I. agent who had performed certain
tests upon the defendant which connected the defendant to a homicide.
In ruling that the prosecution must produce the agent, the court in Lewis
v. Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County,18 stated:

A public prosecutor is entrusted with an awesome duty which requires him to serve
the interests of justice in every case. For this reason, a witness who may have
information which is favorable to the defense must be made available to the deense. 19

14. Id. at 363.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 383.
302 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
Id. at 403.
436 Pa. 296, 260 A.2d 184 (1969).

19. Id. at 189. Another third circuit case on point is State v. Taylor, 49 N.J.
440, 231 A.2d 212 (1967)

asked at trial

(duty to disclose prosecution deal with witness when
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Fourth Circuit
In the fourth circuit, a number of cases have considered the nature of
20
the duties of the prosecution. The first of these, Hamric v. Bailey,
discusses when material should be turned over to the defense. Here the
prosecution withheld a favorable laboratory report from the defense until
after the case had gone to the jury. The court ruled this conduct is prejudicial to the defense and a denial of due process of law. As to what point
in time the prosecution must produce favorable materials for the defense,
the court held:
If it is incumbent on the State to disclose evidence favorable to an accused, manifestly, that disclosure to be effective, must be made at a time when the disclosure
21
would be of value to the accused.

The court found that even if this case had been taken away from the jury
for the presentation of the newly found evidence, the defendant would
still have been prejudiced and would have been denied due process of
law.
In another case, United States v. Elmore,22 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals excused the prosecution's failure to turn over certain information
at the time of a defense demand for this information, concluding that
there was a possibility that the witness in question might be intimidated if
his identity was disclosed before he was called to testify and, therefore,
the government's attempt to protect its witness was justified. The court
did note, however, that the prosecution waited too long for a second request by the defense for the documents in question and stated:
The government should have promptly disclosed the statements as soon as Brawly
was called as a witness. At that point there was no further justification for withholding it, and we do not think that the government should be allowed to await a

second request.

23

It should be noted that the court, nevertheless, failed to find prejudice in
the nondisclosure and affirmed the conviction.
In Regle v. State of Maryland,2 4 the defense had requested the whereabouts of a police agent, which information the prosecutor stated he did
not know, and further, that even if he did, he, nevertheless, was not rerequired to furnish this information to the defense. The defense however,
made attempts to find this agent, alleging that the agent was a material wit20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

386 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1967).
Id. at 393.
423 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 779-80.
9 Md. App. 346, 264 A.2d 119 (1970).
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ness in the case. Although the prosecutor was correct under Maryland
law, the court questioned the prosecutor's conduct:
It may be that the State tried but was unable to locate Isele; if this were true, it may
have been the wiser course had it so stated. On the other hand, the State is not
affirmatively required to locate witnesses who may prove helpful to the accused.
But where the State knows the whereabouts of such a witness, and intentionally, and
without valid reason, fails to disclose it, it may quite unnecessarily be inviting the
reversal of a conviction on constitutional grounds. 25

Fifth Circuit
The courts throughout the fifth circuit have attempted to answer many
of the questions posed by a consideration of the duties of the prosecution.2 6
Such a decision is Jackson v. Wainwright,27 in which a conviction for rape
was reversed because the State suppressed a statement of a witness who
was not called to testify. The State contended that because the defense
knew of the existence of this witness there was no duty to disclose his
earlier exculpatory statements. The court refuted this contention, stating:
We hold that the prosecuting attorney was under a duty to disclose to the defense
the exculpatory statements of Mrs. Elberty. . . . The prosecution's partially
truthful disclosure amounted to affirmative misrepresentation. A defense lawyer
cannot be expected to assume that a witness subpoenaed by the State, even if not
28
called to testify, has evidence favorable to the defense.

A point which has been thoroughly discussed by the state courts within
the fifth circuit is the duty of the prosecution to present all of his evidence at trial. In almost identical decision, the state courts have held that
the prosecution has no such duty. A representative case is State of
Louisiana v. Dickson29 where, although the defendant knew of the evidence in question and the prosecution did not produce this evidence, the
defense still claimed a suppression of evidence by the prosecution.

The

court rejected this argument, stating:
the State could not be compelled to introduce that evidence to make out a case for
the defendant. All the district attorney is required to do under the law is to introduce the evidence relied upon for conviction-he need not introduce evidence relied
upon by the defendant for an acquittal.8O
25. Id. at 359, 264 A.2d at 126. See also Barbee v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964) (duty to disclose is not excused when the
prosecutor is the victim of police suppression).
26. See Means v. State, 429 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (contains a
thorough discussion of the development of the prosecutions' duties at 493-95).
27. 390 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1968).
28. Id. at 298.
29. 248 La. 500, 180 So. 2d 403 (1965).
30. Id. at 507, 180 So. 2d at 405. See also Eagen v. State, 451 S.W.2d 514
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The courts have generally held that the prosecutor's duties extend only
to the actual time of trial. The Florida courts, however, have attempted
to answer the question of whether this duty also arises to post-trial proceedings. In Fast v. State of Florida,3 1 the defense claimed that the prosecution's refusal to investigate an allegedly exculpatory confession which was
produced after the trial, resulted in a denial of due process of law. The

court in ruling that the prosecution's duty towards the defendant does not
exist after the defendant's conviction stated: "We find no authority to
uphold appellant's contention that the state has an affirmative duty to
seek out evidence favorable to the defendant after his conviction. '3 2 Subsequently, this same defendant attempted to persuade the federal district
court that the prosecutor had a duty to continue the investigation past the
time of conviction and to bring all favorable attention to the court's ata3
tention. This contention was similarly rejected in Fast v. Wainwright,
in which the district court held:
No cases have been cited and research indicates no cases to support the contention
that the prosecution's burden to discover evidence favorable to the accused continues beyond the time of conviction and sentence. Brady v. Maryland . . .does
not require this heavy burden ....34

Sixth Circuit

Two state cases found within the sixth circuit conflict as to the prosecutor's duty to call witnesses. In City of Cincinnati v. Young,3 5 the defendant pointed out that the arresting officer was not called to testify at
the trial. To that point the court responded:
[1]t
was within the discretion of the prosecution to call or not call any witness to
testify. The fact that the prosecution did not call the arresting officer did not
prevent the defendant from calling him as a witness for the defendant.3 6

In a contrary case, People v. Dickerson,17 the court ruled that the prose(Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Juarez v. State, 439 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969);
and Murphree v. State, 228 So. 2d 599 (Miss. 1969), for similar holdings.
31. 221 So. 2d 203 (Fla. App. 1969).
32. Id. at 204.
33. 310 F. Supp. 404 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
34. Id. at 406. See also Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir. 1968)
(discussion of the effect of Brady supra note 3 on the duties of the prosecution);
State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550 (Fla. App. 1969) (affirmative duty to disclose
favorable evidence); and Newton v. State of Florida, 178 So. 2d 341 (Fla. App.
1965) (general discussion of the duties of the prosecution and the rights of the
defense).
35. 20 Ohio App. 2d 92, 252 N.E.2d 173 (1969).
36. Id. at 94, 252 N.E.2d at 175.
37. 2 Mich. App. 646, 141 N.W.2d 360 (1966).
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cution did at times have an affirmative duty to call res gestae witnesses
-the same class of witness as the police officer in the Young38 case. The
court in the Dickerson3 9 case also implied that the prosecution should
practice full disclosure, stating that "[t]he only legitimate object of the
prosecution is to show the whole transaction, as it was, whether its tend'40
ency be to establish guilt or innocence.
Seventh Circuit
In the seventh circuit, all three state supreme courts contribute to the
area of the duties of the prosecution. The Supreme Court of Illinois considered whether the prosecution has a duty to present all of its evidence in People v. Nowak. 41 In this case, Nowak was found guilty of
murder and claimed that because all the available eyewitnesses to the
murder were not produced, he was denied due process of law. To this
point the court answered:
The People are not required to call all of the witnesses to a crime in proving the
State's case. Here . . . the witness in question was known and available to defendant and it was his privilege to call her either as his own or as a court's witness depending upon the circumstances. Having failed to call the witness himself,
defendant is in no position to claim prejudice by the failure of the State to use her
testimony .... 42

The Supreme Court of Indiana considered whether the prosecution has
an obligation to present all physical evidence which it has in its possession.
In McDougall v. State of Indiana43 the defendant appealed because
the prosecution failed to introduce certain items into evidence in its prosecution for robbery. As to the duty of the prosecution to present all physical evidence, the court stated:
No authority is cited which holds the prosecution must introduce in evidence every
physical item it possesses relating to the case. All that is required is that the State
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The means used to satisfy this burden, is
44
for the prosecution to determine.

A third related question discussed by a state supreme court in the seventh
circuit is: what kind of evidence must be disclosed-all evidence or
38.

Supra note 35.

39. Supra note 37.
40. Supra note 37, at 651, 141 N.W.2d at 362.
41. 45 Il1. 2d 158, 258 N.E.2d 313 (1970).
42. Id. at 168, 258 N.E.2d at 318. A similar holding is found in People v.
Jones, 121 Ill. App. 2d 268, 257 N.E.2d 514 (1970); People v. Jones, 30 Ill. 2d 186,
195 N.E.2d 698 (1964).
43. - Ind. -, 257 N.E.2d 674 (1970).
44. Id. at -, 257 N.E.2d at 678.
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merely exculpatory evidence? In Price v. State of Wisconsin,45 the prosecution introduced certain evidence which proved to be quite damaging to
the defendant. The state, however, did not give the defendant notice that
this evidence was in its possession or that it would be used. The defendant claimed that under the doctrines of Brady v. Maryland,46 and
Giles v. Maryland,47 the failure to disclose resulted in a denial of due process of law. The court refuted the so-called duty of the prosecution to turn
over exculpatory evidence to the defendant, stating that:
These, however, stand not for the proposition that appellant urges-that notice
must be given of any inculpatory evidence-but rather that the government is obligated to reveal any evidence that tends to prove the innocence of the accused. 48
There is another Illinois case worth noting on the subject of the duties
of the prosecution. In People v. Cagle,49 the Supreme Court of Illinois
placed the duty not so much upon the prosecution as it did upon the trial
court. The defendant had requested a particular police report which contradicted the testimony of the arresting police officers. The defense was
given the report by the prosecution, but the trial judge refused to allow
the defense to use the report at the trial as it was not mentioned during
the direct examination. The trial court had ruled that the prosecution
need only technically comply with the duty of disclosure. The Supreme
Court of Illinois held this to be prejudicial error when it declared:
[T]he trial proceedings reveal technical compliance with the rule that defendant
be furnished on request a copy of favorable evidence, including police reports; but
they also show how effectively defense counsel was deprived of using the report for
impeachment purposes. Merely giving defendant access to the report, while de-

priving him of the use of it, in no way constitutes compliance with the Illinois
rule. 50
Eighth Circuit
The Supreme Court of Arkansas in Smith v. Urban,5 ' set forth a criterion which allows the trial court to determine on a case-by-case basis,
whether the prosecutor has failed in his duties to disclose information to
the defense. The defendant, charged with being an accessory to murder,
claimed that the suppression of a possible exculpatory confession was a
denial of due process. The court, citing the federal district court case of
45.

37 Wis. 2d 117, 154 N.W.2d 222 (1967).

46. Supra note 2.
47. Supra note 8.
48. Supra note 45, at 133-34 n.3, 154 N.W.2d at 230 n.3.
49. 41 111. 2d 528, 244 N.E.2d 203 (1969).
50. Id. at 533, 244 N.E.2d at 203.

51.

245 Ark. 781, 434 S.W.2d 283 (1968).
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Petition of Wright,52 held that, "[w]hether or not a prosecuting attorney
in a criminal case must disclose evidence in his possession favorable to
the accused depends on many factors and a case-by-case judgment must
be made.

53

Many times, defendants have contended that the State has an affirmative duty to seek out favorable evidence for his defense. In State of
Missouri v. Reynolds,5 4 the appellant, earlier found guilty of murder,
claimed exculpatory evidence was to be found in the files of the police
department and not in the prosecutor's files. Although the court was reluctant to definitely state the duties of the prosecution, it did find an absence of such duty with respect to the facts in the instant case. The court
concluded:
We deem it inadvisable to attempt in this opinion to state precisely the duties
placed on the prosecution by reason of Brady v. Maryland, but we are of the opinion that it does not require the prosecution to comb through material not in its
possession in an effort to locate something which, when and if followed up, might
or might not prove to be helpful to the defense, and it does not require that the
prosecuting attorney perform the investigation and preparation for trial which
normally should be performed by defense counsel. 5 5

The argument that the prosecution has a duty to present all physical
evidence in its possession at trial has also been discussed and ruled upon
within the eighth circuit. In Washington v. State of Arkansas,5" a defendant, convicted of unlawful sale of narcotic drugs, advanced such an
argument in his appeal. He claimed that the trial court should have required the State to produce the physical evidence testified to by two of
the State's witnesses. The court rejected this argument stating that, "[i]t
is perfectly permissible, however, for a witness in a criminal case to testify
57
about tangible objects involved in the crime without producing them."1
52. 282 F. Supp. 999 (W.D. Ark. 1968).
53. Supra note 55, at 785, 434 S.W.2d at 286.
54. 422 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1967).
55. Id. at 283.
56. 248 Ark. 318, 451 S.W.2d 449 (1970).
57. Id. at 319, 451 S.W.2d at 450. Other seventh circuit cases worth noting
include: People v. Richards, 120 Il. App. 2d 313, 256 N.E.2d 475 (1970) (no requirement that the prosecution supply the defense with a list of witnesses which the
State does not intend to call); Pierce v. State, 253 Ind. 650, 256 N.E.2d 557 (1970)
(prosecution need not anticipate every theory that appellant might put forth); Britton
v. State, 44 Wis. 2d 109, 170 N.W.2d 785 (1969) (State does not have a duty of
full disclosure); Goetsch v. State, 45 Wis. 2d 285, 172 N.W.2d 688 (1969) (no duty
to present unreported documents); and Gray v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 379, 161 N.W.2d
892 (1968) (no requirement for the State to do what State law prohibits the defendant from doing for himself).
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Ninth Circuit
Are the prosecutor's duties any different when he is before the grand
jury rather than before a trial jury? This question was considered by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Loraine v. United States.5
The defendant in this case moved for a dismissal on the grounds that the
Government suppressed certain evidence in its presentation to the grand
jury. Although the suppression of evidence is generally held to be a denial of due process of law, the Court ruled that the duty of the prosecutor is
not extended to his presentation before the grand jury. The court held:
[T]he duty of the prosecuting authorities at the trial, and their duty when presenting a case before a grand jury, are not necessarily the same. . . . Similarly,
we hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to invalidate a federal indictment
because the Government did not produce before the grand jury all evidence in its
possession tending to undermine the credibility of the witnesses appearing before

that body. 59

The court of appeals of California discussed the duties of the prosecution in presenting witnesses and pursuing every possible means of investigation in People v. Noisey. 0 Here the defendant claimed a suppression of evidence primarily because an investigating officer failed to lift
fingerprints at the scene of the crime. There were, however, two eyewitnesses to the crime. The court, citing People v. Tuthill,61 discussed
the duty of the prosecution to call witnesses in the making of its investigation and concluded:
There is no compulsion on the prosecution to call any particular witness or to make
any particular tests so long as there is fairly presented to the court the material evidence bearing upon the charge for which the defendant is on trial. 62 The mere
fact investigating officers do not pursue every possible means of investigation does
evidence.
not, standing alone, constitute a denial of due process or suppression 6of
8
.. . the defendant must demonstrate that he has been prejudiced thereby.
In 1970, the Supreme Court of Washington ruled that the prosecution
was under no duty to submit evidence to the defense prior to trial. In
State of Washington v. Tyler,64 the defendant appealed, contending
the trial court erred in refusing to direct the prosecution to furnish the defense with copies of earlier statements given by state witnesses to government authorities. The court ruled on the defense's point by stating:
58. 396 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1968).
59. Id. at 339.
60. 265 C.A.2d 543, 71 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1968).
61. 31 Cal. 2d 92, 187 P.2d 16 (1947).
62. Id. at 98, 187 P.2d at 19.
63. Supra note 60, at 550, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
64. 77 Wash. 2d 726, 466 P.2d 120 (1970).
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It is the general rule in this country, supported, we think, by the great weight of
authority, that the prosecuting attorney is under no general obligation to submit
any evidence in his possession to counsel for the defense. This rule applies to
65
the written statements of witnesses as well as substantive evidence.

Tenth Circuit

Within the state courts of the tenth circuit, two quite similar points were
examined with substantially the same result.

In Hampton v. People,66

the defendant, convicted of murder, appealed, claiming that the prosecution's failure to call two F.B.I. agents to testify in support of a written
report was a denial of due process of law. The testimony would have
favored the defense but the defense was allowed to read the report into
the record before the jury. The court stated: "A prosecuting attorney
is not obliged to call any particular witness, but may try his case in his own
way and at his discretion call those witnesses he chooses." '67 It should be
further noted that in the instant case, the defense had compulsory process

which could have been used if it had so chosen.
In a second case, Bearden v. State of Oklahoma,68 after a dispute with
the trial court over the court's failure to grant any further continuances,
both the defendant and his trial attorney stood mute throughout the entire proceeding. On appeal following his conviction, the defendant
claimed that due process was violated in that all the evidence, was oneThe court resided, having been presented only by the prosecution.
prosecution
and the
duties
of
the
the
and
discussed
jected this argument

corresponding duties of the defense:
Any defense to be offered to prove an act of homicide to have been either excusable
or justifiable . . . is a matter for the defendant to present. It is not sufficient for
defense counsel to 'lay behind a log' and do nothing, expecting the prosecution to
69
explain the defendant's actions.
Districtof Columbia

From the court of appeals for the District of Columbia come two widely
65. Id. at 736, 466 P.2d at 126. Other eighth circuit cases and holdings include: Hemphill v. United States, 392 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1968) (no duty to inform prior to trial the facts of a government witness's criminal record), State of
Missouri v. Davis, 450 S.W.2d 168 (Mo. 1970) (discussion of Missouri court rulings on prosecution duties at 172), and State v. Thompson, 396 S.W.2d 697 (Mo.
1965) (non-production and argument of the prosecutor amounted to a denial of
due process of law).
66. 171 Colo. 153, 465 P.2d 394 (1970).
67. Id. at 162, 465 P.2d at 399.
68. 458 P.2d 914 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969).
69. Id. at 925 n.6.
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cited cases regarding the duties of the prosecution. In the first, Griffin
v. United States,70 the question arose as to whether the prosecution should
have informed the defense about a penknife found in the pocket of the
deceased in a murder case. The defense had claimed self-defense and this
knife would probably have been useful to the defense. The prosecution thought the penknife would have been inadmissible and withheld the
knife. In reversing, the court of appeals cautioned the prosecution with
respect to its duty to reveal material evidence by ruling:
[T]he case emphasizes the necessity of disclosure by the prosecution of evidence
that may reasonably be considered admissible and useful to the defense. When
there is substantial room for doubt, the prosecution is not to decide for the court
what is admissible or for the defense what is useful....
71

The prosecution's duty to disclose and its possible ramifications were
again examined in Levin v. Katzenbach.72 In this case the prosecution failed to reveal to the defendant the prior statement of one of its
key witnesses. The court, in remanding the case for an evidentiary
hearing, placed a duty of disclosure upon the prosecution. The court
felt that:
Requiring government disclosure will not encourage defense counsel to be careless
in trial preparation since there can be no assurance that the government, even with
all its resources, will discover all significant evidence favorable to the defense.
And we do not suggest that the government is required to search for evidence
favorable to the accused, or to disclose all its evidence, however insignificant, to
the defense. 7 3
THE

NEED FOR A DEFENDANT'S REQUEST

INTRODUCTION

Are there any duties incumbent upon the defense before it may be
claimed that the prosecution violated the defendant's right to due process
of law? Returning to the holding of Brady v. Maryland,74 one should
note that the Courts specifically mentioned the requirement of a request
by the defendant:
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to
7
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution. 5
70.
71.
72.
73.
where
circuit
74.
75.

183 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
Id. at 993.
363 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Id. at 291. See also Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1967),
after the district court held that the evidence suppressed was not material, the
court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Id. at 87.
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Note the emphasized words "upon request." Are these words intended
as a requirement for the defense in all cases or are they merely reflection of
the fact situation of that particular case? From the discussion that follows, it will become apparent that the courts throughout the country are
in complete disagreement as to the need for a defense request as a condition precedent to a claimed violation of due process.7 6
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS

Although the words "upon request" limit the Court's holding in Brady,
a later decision indicated that there was no need for such a request by
the defense. In Giles v. State of Maryland,77 Mr. Justice Fortas, in a concurring opinion, referring to the Brady decision, argued that there should
be no need for such a request:
I see no reason to make the result turn on the adventitious circumstance of a request. If the defense does not know of the existence of the evidence, it may not
be able to request its production. A murder trial-indeed any criminal proceed78
ing-is not a sporting event.

Although Mr. Justice Fortas's opinion has been widely cited, thus far it
has not been accepted by a majority of the Justices of the United States
Supreme Court, and cannot be cited as prevailing authority.
INTERPRETATIONS WITHIN THE CIRCUITS

FirstCircuit
To date, the only decision or point issued by the first circuit is State v.
Anderson,79 in which the Supreme Court of New Hampshire apparently
upheld the need for a defense request. Here the defendant, claiming that
certain evidence was suppressed appealed his conviction for unlawful assembly. The court refused to accept his arguments and, in affirming
the conviction, pointed out that there was no request by the defendant
which would have called for the particular evidence at the trial.80 The
court further noted that the evidence would have tended to be cumulative
and refused to grant a new trial.
Second Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has given rather thorough
76.

There are no cases cited in this chapter from the fifth, sixth, or D.C.

circuits.
77. 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
78.

Supra note 77, at 102.

79.

108 N.H. 9, 226 A.2d 790 (1967).
Id. at 10, 226 A.2d at 791.

80.
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consideration to the question of the need for a prior request; by the defense, however, the court's decisions have been quite inconsistent. In
1961, in United States v. Grabina,8 1 the defendant was convicted of possessing counterfeit Federal Reserve Bank notes and in his appeal alleged
that certain statements of his co-conspirators were not made available to
him by the prosecution, and this prosecutorial conduct amounted to reversible error. The court rejected his claim, curtly noting that no request
was made for the statements:
The short answer to this is that no request was made for the statements nor any
motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3500, and there is no reason to suppose that any such
statements would have been withheld if requested. There is no reversible error

here.

82

83
Three years later, however, in United States ex rel Meers v. Wilkins,

the court specifically held that no request was necessary. Meers alleged
that the State withheld the names of two witnesses to the crime of which
he was convicted. The district court granted habeas corpus, and the
State appealed, claiming that there was no request for the allegedly suppressed information, and, hence, no denial of due process. The court, in
contrasting this case to that of Brady v. Maryland,8 4 stated:
The case before us differs from Brady in that the defense counsel never requested
the disclosure of evidence from the prosecution, but we think that such request is
not a sine qua non to establish a duty on the prosecution's part.8 5

The court again reversed itself in United States v. Keogh,80 an appeal of
a conviction for conspiracy to obstruct justice, wherein suppression of certain F.B.I. reports was claimed to be error. Noting that there had been no
request for the reports, the court determined that this was not an obvious
case of deliberate suppression of evidence:
We cannot agree with petitioner that where there has not been deliberate suppression in either of the senses we have outlined, the absence of a request is irrelevant. It serves the valuable office of flagging the importance of the evidence for the
defense and thus imposes on the prosecutor a duty to make a careful check of his
files ....
87

In another similar case the court determined that if a request is made, it
must be directed to the proper party to be effective. In United States ex
rel Fein v. Deegan, 8 defendant, convicted of murder, claimed a suppres81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

295 F.2d 792 (2nd Cir. 1961).
Id. at 793.
326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964).
Supra note 74.
Supra note 83, at 137.
391 F.2d 138 (2nd Cir. 1968).
Id. at 147.
410 F.2d 13 (2nd Cir. 1969).
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sion by the prosecution of the name and address of a possible defense witness. An investigator working for the appellant had made the request for
the information to a police detective who was working on the case. The
detective refused to reveal the requested information, and the defense
failed to follow up the request. The court refused to find error, because
the request was made to an improper party:
[Tihere was not only no request for Dagmar's full name, address, or telephone
number but also no indication that the defense could not locate her ....
But in
our view, it would be unfair and inequitable to charge the prosecutor with the responsibility for any oral request which was made by an employee of the defendant,
such as an investigator, to an employee of the prosecutor, such as a detective....
89

Third Circuit
In the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, consideration was given
to the degree of precision which was required on the part of the defense
in requesting information from the prosecution in the case of United States
ex rel. Felton v. Rundle.90 In the original trial for robbery, the defense counsel had made a request for certain police reports, but the trial
court turned down the request, informing counsel that he may raise the request at a later time. The defense counsel failed to make that later request. Because of that failure, the majority of this court found that there
was no suppression of evidence or denial of due process of law:
Moreover for the relator did not object to the ruling of the trial judge, and thereafter
made no attempt to obtain the police report or even to discover if in fact it contained matter useful to the defense. 9 1

In a strongly worded dissent, Judge Biggs refused to believe that the defense was under a duty to make repeated requests for the information:
The majority seems to take the position that there must be more than one request
for examination of a pertinent document; in fact, that the accused must go on knocking at the door until the trial judge sees fit in his own good time to open it. In my
opinion one request is enough, for a constitutional right is neither aided nor injured
by constant reassertion or reiteration. The majority seemingly asserts the position
that an accused must find an exact combination of words and keep repeating them
at artful times in order to maintain a constitutional right. I cannot agree with such
a view ....

92

89. Id. at 19. Another case worth noting is United States v. Tellier, 255 F.2d
441 (2nd Cir. 1958), where the defense inquired as to whether a certain report
was available but failed to request it and the court ruled there was no denial of due
process of law.
90. 410 F.2d 1300 (3rd Cir. 1969).
91. Id. at 1304.
92. Id. at 1305.

1971]

COMMENTS

439

In a Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decision, Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania v. Osborne,9 3 the court stated in very simple terms how
a defendant can avert a suppression of evidence by the prosecution. At
the defendant's murder trial the prosecution failed to produce the bullets
which caused the fatal wounds. Defendant contended that this was a
suppression of evidence which amounted to a denial of due process. Because there was no request for the bullets, the court dismissed the allegation of suppression:
All that was required of him to obtain them was a formal call for the production of
such bullet or bullets at trial. . . . [Titrial counsel knew of the existence of the
bullets and knew what to ask for. Under these circumstances it cannot be said that
the district attorney deliberately suppressed the bullets simply because he failed to
94
introduce them.

Fourth Circuit

The prevailing law in the fourth circuit is that no request is necessary.

5
the defendant claimed
In Barbee v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary,"

that the prosecution suppressed a report of ballistic and fingerprint tests
made by the police department. The prosecution asserted that because no
request was made no duty to produce the reports for the defense arose.
The court refused to accept the prosecution contention:
It is no answer that Barbee's attorney failed to ask for the results of the tests.
While a diligent defense counsel might have learned about the police reports, this
is too speculative a consideration to outweigh any unfairness that actually resulted at the trial. 9 0

In Clements v. Coiner,9 7 a habeas corpus proceeding, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia took an
historical approach in determining that a request was not necessary in the
given fact situation. First noting the number of decisions which held that
a request was unnecessary, the court pointed out that defendant was convicted before the Brady9 8 decision. Furthermore, even with a request, the
report in question would probably not have been turned over to the defense. Thus, a request on the part of the defense would have been a fu99
tile gesture and as such should not have been required.

93.

433 Pa. 297, 249 A.2d 330 (1969).

94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 300, 249 A.2d at 332.
331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964).
Id. at 845.
299 F. Supp. 752 (S.D. W. Va. 1969).

98.

Supra note 74.

99.

Supra note 97, at 758.
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Seventh Circuit
The Supreme Court of Illinois reflected the split in opinion over the
need for a request in the case of People v. Moore.100 After being convicted of murder, the defendant appealed, alleging a suppression of evidence by the prosecution denied him due process of law. The prosecution answered, arguing that no request was ever made for the information
allegedly suppressed and, thus, no duty arose to produce it. The majority of the court, affirming the conviction, enunciated the rationale underlying the requirement of a request by defendant:
[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon

request violates due process where the evidence is material ....

To sustain de-

fendant's contention would be to require the prosecution to fully report every detail

of lengthy police investigations including the following up of useless leads and discussions with immaterial witnesses. 101

However, Mr. Justice Schaefer, dissenting, stated his belief that there was
no necessity for a defense request:
I do not believe that the Supreme Court intended to establish a request as an indispensible prerequisite to disclosure by the prosecution. . . . I cannot believe that
the Supreme Court intended to narrow the duty of the prosecution as it had existed
prior to Brady by making that duty contingent upon a request when the defense is
ignorant of the existence of the suppressed information.1 02

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has concurred in the Moore decision
in Goetsch v. State of Wisconsin,'"3 where it stated, "The Constitution
imposes no duty upon the state to produce unrequested documents."' 04
However, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit excused the lack
of a proper defense request in United States v. Poole.'0 5 In this case
the victim of the alleged kidnapping stated incorrectly that she had gone
to a certain "Dr. Green" for examination following the kidnapping. When
the defense counsel was unable to find this doctor, he did not attempt to
gather any further information on the matter or attempt to see if there was

a mistake as to the doctor's identity. The defense then claimed a suppression of favorable evidence by the prosecution, but the prosecution
argued, "no request-no duty." The court excused the defense counsel's
lack of diligence due to the prosecutorial misconduct of failing to correct
the statement at the time of the preliminary hearing:
100.

42 Ill. 2d 73, 246 N.E.2d 299 (1969).

101.

Id. at 80-81, 246 N.E.2d at 304.

102.

Id. at 89-90, 246 N.E.2d at 308-09.

103.

45 Wis. 2d 285, 172 N.W.2d 688 (1969).

104.

Id. at 292, 172 N.W.2d at 691.

105. 379 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1967).

1971]

COMMENTS

441

It it true, as the government argues, that defense counsel was not diligent in following up the information obtained at the preliminary hearing, despite its inaccuracy.
The government failed to correct the misinformation, however, and we think under these circumstances Poole should not suffer for the mistake of his counsel. 1 0 6

Eighth Circuit
The Supreme Court of Arkansas has ruled in alternate decisions that a
defense request both is and is not required. In Smith v. Urban,10 7 the
court, citing United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkens,'0 8 determined that a
request by the defense is not essential, and reversed defendant's conviction. In Washington v. State of Arkansas,'0 9 however, the court affirmed

an earlier conviction because "there was no request in the court below
that the capsules be produced. Consequently there was no adverse ruling by the trial court upon which a claim of error can now be based." 11 0
In State of Minnesota v. Hanson,"' the Supreme Court of Minnesota
found that the defendant failed to state specifically what was suppressed,
and, therefore, affirmed his conviction. The court, in examining the obligations of the prosecution in this case, said:
It is clear to us that if the state had such evidence in its possession at time of trial,
it was obligated to produce it, particularly where, as in this case, a demand was
made by defendant's counsel that such evidence-specifically, copies of any writings attributed to defendant-be produced.... 112

Ninth Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered the need for a
defense request in Peoples v. Hocker.11 Peoples was wound guilty of
murder in Nevada and, on appeal, claimed a suppression of the autopsy
report. The record did not show a request for the production of the report but merely a notation that a report be sent to the district attorney or
the trial court. The court of appeals ruled directly upon the point of the
lack of request:
During trial, Peoples never asked that a copy of the autopsy report be produced.
106. Id. at 649. See also Fair v. State, 252 Ind. 494, 250 N.E.2d 744 (1969) (no
attempt to gain the information from the prosecution, hence no prejudice to the
defense).
107. 245 Ark. 781, 434 S.W.2d 283 (1968).

108. 326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964).
109. 248 Ark. 318, 451 S.W.2d 449 (1970).

110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 319, 451 S.W.2d at 450.
286 Minn. 317, 176 N.W.2d 607 (1970).
Id. at 334, 176 N.W.2d at 618.
423 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1970).
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In fact when Dr. Joy testified at the trial, Peoples made no mention of the autopsy
report, although it had been discussed on direct examination. Under these circumstances there was no unconstitutional suppression of evidence on the part of the
district attorney. We have no reason to doubt that if the report had been asked
14
for at the trial, it would have been produced.
Tenth Circuit

In Lewis v. State of Oklahoma,115 the defendant was convicted of murder and appealed.

After relief was denied by the state courts, he brought

a habeas corpus action in the district court, claiming a suppression of
evidence by the prosecution. The court noted that there was no request
for the evidence made at trial, and then compared the holdings of Brady
v. Maryland,'" and Giles v. State of Maryland."7 After reviewing the
criteria for setting forth a case under Brady, especially the requirement
that "]t[he evidence was suppressed and not made available to the Petitioner upon his request therefor,"' 1i8 the court held:
Had the Supreme Court desired to turn the Giles case on a rule of compulsory
disclosure without request, it could have done so. Therefore, this Court takes the
request requirement of the Brady case as the Supreme Court's definitive expression
on the matter. 1 19

Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Mexico in State v. Vigil, 120 held that
such a request on the defendant's part is necessary. The defendant, convicted of unlawful possession and sale of narcotic drugs, claimed a suppres-

sion of certain viles of seized drugs and a resulting denial of due process
under Brady and other authorities.

The court refused to sustain the de-

fendant's assertions, stating:
Each of these cases treats the suppression by the prosecution of material evidence
favorable to and requested by the accused as a denial of due process of law. It
cannot be reasonably be said, in our opinion, that evidence of this character involved here is suppressed or withheld by the prosecution, if the defendant knowing
it to have been in possession of the prosecution fails to demand its production.' 2 1
114. Id. at 963.
115. 304 F. Supp. 116 (W.D. Okla. 1969).
116. Supra note 74.
117. Supra note 77.
118. Supra note 115, at 120.
119. Supra note 115, at 120-21. See also Tilford v. Page,
(W.D. Okla. 1969), the companion to the Lewis case which
results for the same reasons.
120. 79 N.M. 80, 439 P.2d 729 (1968).
121. Id. at 81-82, 439 P.2d at 730-31. See also De Baca
163 Colo. 516, 431 P.2d 763 (1967) (no defense request, hence no

307 F. Supp. 781
reached the same

v. District Court,
suppression).
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WHAT MUST BE DISCLOSED:

MATERIALITY AND DISCOVERY

INTRODUCTION

In considering what the prosecution must disclose, one again must refer
to Brady v. Maryland,122 wherein the criteria for disclosure is framed in
these terms: ". .. where the evidence is material either as to guilt or to
punishment, .,123
Therefore, exactly what type of evidence is material
must first be determined. Once the question of whether evidence is material or not has been examined, it becomes necessary to discuss the
proper means of obtaining this evidence for the defense. The Jencks
Act, 124 has set forth procedures for discovery in federal cases; the corresponding state procedures will also be analyzed. Other areas to be considered under this topic include the discretionary powers of the court regarding the admissability of in camera inspections and whether the defendant should be permitted to go on so-called "fishing expeditions."
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS

The United States Supreme Court has dealt quite extensively with the
problems of disclosure. One of the most important of these cases is Jencks
v. United States,125 wherein the defendant was violating the National Labor Relations Act. At his trial, he introduced a motion for the production of certain reports made by two F.B.I. agents who had testified against
him, but the motion was denied by the trial court, on the ground that
Jencks had failed to lay a proper foundation of inconsistency in the agents'
testimony. The Court first ruled that this foundation was unnecessary because "a sufficient foundation was established by the testimony of Matusow and Ford that their reports were of the events and activities related
in their testimony." 126 The Court then reaffirmed the principles already
established by Gordon v. United States,127 which held in part: "For production purposes, it need only appear that the evidence is relevant, competent, and outside of any exclusionary rule. . . .
In many cases after
a defense request for evidence, courts have inspected the requested evidence in camera to determine whether the defense may use it, but in
Jencks the use of this procedure was disapproved:
"28

122.

373 U.S. 83 (1963).

123.

Id. at 87.

124.
125.

18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
353 U.S. 657 (1957).

126. Id. at 666.
127. 344 U.S. 414 (1953).
128. Supra note 125, at 667, quoting Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414,
420 (1953).
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We hold, further, that petitioner is entitled to inspect the reports to decide whether
to use them in his defense. Because only the defense is adequately equipped to
determine the effective use for purpose of discrediting the Government's witness and
thereby furthering the accused's defense, the defense must initially be entitled to see
them to determine what use may be made of them. Justice requires no less. The
practice of producing government documents to the trial judge for his determination
29
of relevancy and materiality, without hearing the accused, is disapproved.'
Following this decision, Congress passed the Jencks Act, which established rules of discovery in federal criminal cases, a codification of the
Jencks decision.' 8 0
In Giles v. State of Maryland,'8 ' the United States
clined to accept the Maryland court's interpretations
evidence must be disclosed to the defense. As noted
the Giles case had suppressed reports tending to show

ties of the prosecutrix.

Supreme Court deas to what type of
earlier, the State in
the sexual proclivi-

When the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed, it

delineated what type of nondisclosure would amount to a denial of due
process of law:
[I]t must be such as is material and capable of clearing or tending to clear the
accused of guilt or of substantially affecting the punishment to be imposed in
addition to being such as could reasonably be considered admissible and useful to
132
the defense.

The United States Supreme Court in declining to accept the Maryland interpretation stated:
Thus the case presents the broad question whether the prosecution's constitutional
duty to disclose extends to all evidence admissible and useful to the defense and the
degree of prejudice which must be shown to make necessary a new trial. We find,
however, that it is unnecessary and therefore inappropriate to examine these questions.133

The case was nevertheless reversed for the purpose of holding an evidentiary hearing.
INTERPRETATIONS WITHIN THE CIRCUITS
First Circuit
Two state supreme court rulings within the First Circuit consider the
duties of the defense and the discretion of the trial court in allowing pre129. Supra note 125, at 668-69. Note also Mr. Justice Burton's concurring
opinion which urged the use of in camera inspection by the trial court at 675-76.
130. See United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969) where the Supreme
Court applied the Jencks Act in the case of certain lost interview tapes.
131. 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
132. State v. Giles, 239 Md. 458, 469-70, 212 A.2d 101, 108 (1965).
133. Supra note 131, at 73-74.
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trial discovery. In Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. French,'s 4 seven de-

fendants were found guilty of conspiracy and six of them of murder. In a
discussion of the less significant issues raised in the case, the court spoke of
the need for specificity by the defense in moving for pre-trial inspection:
The trial judge was not required to grant motions for inspection of exculpatory evidence, or of the results of scientific and other examinations made in connection
with the case, in the absence of greater specification of the areas of desired in35
quiry.x

In the second case, State of New Hampshire v. Superior Court,8 6 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed a court order which granted
inspections and examinations of various items under a defense motion for
discovery. The court ruled that the trial court had the power to grant
the motion. After quoting from Regan v. Superior Court,1 7 the court
held: "We reaffirm the inherent power of our trial court to permit such
inspections and examinations if it finds that justice so requires. .. .
The court further held that all the items requested by the defense except
the "work-product" of the prosecution were susceptible of inspection:
We hold that notes personally compiled by law enforcement authorities in the
course of their investigation, even if they include notes of conversations with the
accused, constitute the work product of the State and are privileged from pretrial
discovery.18 9

Second Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has resisted granting broad
discovery powers to the defense. The defendants in United States v. Jordan,140 appealed a conviction of bank robbery, contending that the trial
judge's refusal of a defense request for a complete search of the government's files amounted to a denial of due process, and that Brady v.
Maryland,14 ' authorized such a search. The court held, however, that the
Brady decision did not require the government to disclose "the myriad
immaterial statements and names and addressses which any extended investigation is bound to produce.' 42 The court further stated that ma134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

357 Mass. 356, 259 N.E.2d 195 (1970).
Id. at -, 259 N.E.2d at 227.
106 N.H. 228, 208 A.2d 832 (1965).
102 N.H. 224, 226-27, 153 A.2d 403, 406 (1959).
Supra note 136, at 230, 208 A.2d at 833-34.
Supra note 136, at 230, 208 A.2d at 834.
399 F.2d 610 (2nd Cir. 1968).
Supra note 122.
Supra note 140, at 615.
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teriality is not for the defense to decide but rather for the trial court, sub143
ject to appellate review.
The second circuit court of appeals established further criteria in
United States v. Evanchick,14 affirming a conviction for transporting
stolen goods in interstate commerce. Upon defendants' request for discovery, the trial court instructed the defendants to narrow their request
for information. Further requests by the defendants also proved too
broad and failed to state how the information would be useful. The court
of appeals, in upholding the trial court's ruling, stated: "The Court's denial of the motion for inspection was proper. Neither Brady v. Maryland .
, nor any other case requires the government to afford a criminal defendant a general right of discovery ... 14
Third Circuit

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has considered in two early
cases, United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi,146 and United States ex rel.
Thompson v. Dye, 147 what need and need not be disclosed. In Alm-

meida, 48 the court considered the duty to turn over physical evidence
to the the defense. In A lmeida, a murder trial, the prosecution had
suppressed a spent bullet which would have shown that Almeida did not
commit the murder, although he had taken part in the crime. This information would have had no effect as to the murder charge but might have
influenced the jury's decision as to the sentence. The court, therefore,
found:
We think that the conduct of the Commonwealth as outlined in the instant case is
in conflict with our fundamental principles of liberty and justice. The suppression
of evidence favorable to Almeida was a denial of due process .... 149

In Thompson, a prisoner under sentence of death for first-degree murder appealed the denial of a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that
the suppression of vital evidence, material to issues of guilt and penalty,
denied him due process of law. The alleged suppressed evidence consisted
of pre-trial statements made by the arresting officer and others to the
prosecutor that, at the time of the arrest, Thompson was intoxicated and
showed signs of having been in a fight. The question was whether these
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Supra note 140, at 615.
413 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1969).
Id. at 953.
195 F.2d 815 (3rd Cir. 1952).
221 F.2d 763 (3rd Cir. 1955).
Supra note 152.
Supra note 152, at 820.
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observations were vital to Thompson's case. The court, in finding that
they were of importance to Thompson's case and should have been turned
over to the defense, held:
Nor can it be held as a matter of law to be unimportant to the defense here. It
was substantial evidence which should have been but never was submitted to the
jury . . . in connection with what the court did charge as to the effect of the
drunkenness of Thompson or that he was under the influence of marijuana or a
drug at the time of the killing .... 150

Although the Third Circuit has held that both physical and observational
evidence must be disclosed to the defense, the court has not held that all
material should be given over to the defense. In United States v. Fioravanti,151 the defendant requested anything that could be useful to his defense, including information concerning how the government intended to
prove its case. The court found that federal procedural rules did not require the prosecution to "disclose all the minutia of its evidence, to reveal
its trial strategy, and to deliniate with total specificity the case it intends
to present." 152 The court further distinguished this case from Brady v.
Maryland,1 5 3 in that the prosecution possessed only incriminating state154
ments as opposed to the exculpatory statements suppressed in Brady.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has ruled that evidence pointing to
the credibility of witnesses is material and must be disclosed to the defense. In State of New Jersey v. Vigliano,1 55 the defendant appealed a
conviction of murder, claiming a suppression of material evidence by the
prosecution. The prosecution's key witness, the defendant's father, had
been found mentally ill and two physicians recommended that he be committed to a mental institution. When the defense attempted to question
this witness as to his earlier psychiatric study, the prosecution, which knew
of the psychiatrists' findings, objected to the question and was sustained
by the trial court. The trial court held that this was not prejudicial error
as the father's value as a witness had been destroyed both through crossexamination and by police officers' testimony that the father seemed to be
intoxicated on the night of the murder. The Supreme Court of New Jersey disagreed with the trial court and ruled that the information in ques150.
151.
152.
153.

Supra note 147, at 767.
412 F.2d 407 (3rd Cir. 1969).
Id. at 411.
Supra note 122.

154. See also Lewis v. Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County, 426 Pa.
296, 300, 260 A.2d 184, 187 (1969): "[fln the absence of exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons an accused has no right to the inspection or disclosure before trial of evidence in possession of the prosecution."
155. 50 N.J. 51, 232 A.2d 129 (1967).

448

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXI

tion should have been disclosed: "[T]he grave delinquency of the State
cannot be overlooked. .... Even where the evidence concerns only the
credibility of a State's witness against defendant, it denies him a fair trial
and violates due process.
Fourth Circuit
There are times when evidence does not become material until something occurs to make it so. For example in Barbee v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary,157 the appellant claimed a denial of due process by the
prosecution's failure to produce potentially exculpatory evidence, namely
a report on ballistic and fingerprint tests made by the police, which would
have been favorable to Barbee's case. The revolver used in the crime
was presented by the prosecution for identification and not as evidence.
Although the State claimed that the report had no probative value, the
court ruled that this report should have been turned over to the defense.
It was noted that the report became relevant as soon as the revolver was
produced by the prosecution, albeit only for identification purposes:
"[T]he evidence tending to exculpate the petitioner became highly relevant the instant his revolver was produced in open court, formally marked
for identification, and witnesses interrogated about it.' 1 5 8 The court further stated that in cases of doubt the prosecution should turn the evidence
over to the court. The court cited Griffin v. United States," 9 which held
in part that "[w]hen there is substantial room for doubt, the prosecution
is not to decide for the court what is admissible or for the defense what is
60
useful."1
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has considered who is
best able to decide what evidence is favorable to the defense in United
States v. Mitchell.'' Prior to the defendant's trial for bank robbery, the
defense counsel moved for disclosure of the entire government file. The
trial judge made an in camera inspection of the file and turned some material over to the defense. The defense contended that only the defense
could make a proper determination of what information was favorable to
him. It appears the trial judge's refusal was based, at least in part, upon
an attempt to insure the safety of certain government witnesses. In affirming, the court stated:
156.
157.

Id. at 60,

232 A.2d at 133-34.
331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964).

158. Id. at 845.
159. 183 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
160. Supra note 157, at 845.
161. 408 F.2d 996 (4th Cir. 1969).
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We think that the District Judge properly exercised his discretion. Witnesses for the
prosecution can be endangered when their identities are prematurely disclosed to
persons accused of violent crimes. The trial judge was correct in weighing the
62
safety of potential witnesses in deciding whether to disclose the entire file.'

The problem of whether to allow the defendant to go "rummaging" or
on a "fishing expedition" through the prosecution files was discussed in
United States v. Frazier.16 3 The appeal in this conviction for bank robbery was based upon the trial court's refusal to grant an in camera inspection of the Government's files to determine the presence of exculpa1 65
64
tory information. The appellants cited both the Brady' and Barbee
decisions as their authority for such a request. The court first pointed
out that the defendants had no knowledge of exculpatory evidence, had
never alleged that such information existed and had not claimed that anything was hidden from the defense. The court then went on to hold that
[tihe obligation upon the Government not to suppress favorable evidence [Brady],
and affirmatively to disclose [Barbee], does not make it incumbent upon the trial
1 66
judge to rummage through the file on behalf of the defendant.

The Maryland Court of Appeals considered whether to allow the defendant to become privy to the case which the State expected to present
against him in Presley v. State of Maryland.16 7 Here the appeal, following a conviction for rape, was based upon the trial court's refusal to furnish, prior to trial, the substance of testimony which the prosecution hoped
to elicit from its witnesses. The State turned over a list of its witnesses but
not the requested information. The court of appeals rejected the defense
contention and in affirming the conviction stated: "We are not aware of
any constitutional or statutory requirement which compels the State to furnish the appellant with the substance of the testimony to be given by its

witnesses."' 168
Fifth Circuit
Within the Fifth Circuit, a number of points dealing with disclosure have
been considered, the first of which concerns the use of the in camera in162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 998.
394 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1968).
Supra note 122.
Supra note 157.

166. Supra note 163, at 262.
167. 6 Md. App. 419, 251 A.2d 622 (1969).
168. Id. at 430, 251 A.2d at 628. See also United States v. Harris, 409 F.2d
77 (4th Cir., 1969), where it was recited in dicta that Brady does not require the
trial court to grant in camera inspections; and Ward v. State of Maryland, 2 Md.
App. 687, 236 A.2d 740 (1968), where the court refused to allow the defense to
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In Williams v. Dutton,16 9 the court discussed the use

of the in camera procedure and its rationale for authorizing that procedure:
In the circumstances of this case, we think the question should be determined in
camera by the state courts. If, after examination of the demanded evidence, the
state court determines that favorable evidence "material either to guilt or to punishThe
ment" has been suppressed, then Williams must be granted a new trial ....
right of the accused to have evidence material to his defense cannot depend upon
the benevolence of the prosecutor. Likewise we reject appellant Williams' contention that the prosecution's files should have been open to him. . . . We
think that unlimited discovery of the state's files would unduly impair effective
prosecution of criminal cases. On the other hand, since the investigative resources
of the state are generally far superior to those of the defendant, a total exclusion of
the accused from the evidence gathered by the prosecution also seems unwarranted.
We therefore think that the procedure which we adopt in this case is a necessary
170
compromise of the conflicting interests of state and accused.

Florida in State
The use of the in camera inspection was also authorized in
172
17 1
of Floridav. Gillespie, and State of Floridav. Drayton.
The state courts within the Fifth Circuit are nearly unanimous in refusing
to allow a defendant to go rummaging through the prosecution's files. In
Sanders v. State of Alabama,178 the defendant, who was convicted of
first degree murder, appealed, claiming as error the trial court's refusal
to allow inspection of certain documents. The defendant cited Brady v.
Maryland,1 7 as authority, but the court refused to accept Brady as a permit for a "fishing expedition." The court stated in part:

We can see no violation of the rule of the Brady case, supra, in the action of the
trial court in refusing to require the State to produce all that was requested by
Sanders in his motion to produce. He was not entitled to a mere fishing expedition. ... 175

In Bell v. State of Texas,176 the Texas court affirmed a murder conviction
after the appellant claimed that the overruling of a motion for discovery
by the trial court was error. The court noted that the motion failed to
state the nature of the items sought, that they were material either to her
"conduct a thorough examination of all information and docurments known to the
State and its investigators."
169. 400 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1968).
170. Id. at 800-01.
171. 227 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1969).
172. Infra note 179.
173. 278 Ala. 453, 179 So. 2d 35 (1965).
174. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
175. Supra note 173 at 457, 179 So. 2d at 39.
176. 442 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
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defense or to the issue of punishment, or for that matter, that the State was
1 77
in possession of these items. The court, referring to Brady v. Maryland,
and similar cases, held that these decisions
. . . do not stand for the proposition advanced by appellant here-that she should
have been granted carte blanche in rummaging through the state's files in the hope
of uncovering some shred of evidence which might be of assistance to her either
78
on the issue of guilt or punishment.'

When evidence should be turned over to the defense by the prosecution arose in State of Florida v. Drayton.'79 Here, the State appealed
a court order for an in camera inspection of the grand jury testimony of
the prosecutrix in a rape case. In ruling upon that appeal, the court discussed the timing of disclosure with its constitutional implications:
After careful examination, we are of the opinion that the accused in a criminal
trial has the right, protected by the Constitution, to have the prosecution disclose
to him favorable evidence material either to guilt or punishment with adequate time
allowed to utilize it fully. However, he has no constitutionally protected right to
1 80
examine such evidence prior to trial.

The Georgia courts have been consistent in holding that there is no constitutional requirement for pre-trial discovery. This holding was stated in
8
Bryan v. State of Georgia,1 ' an appeal following a conviction for murder.

The appeal was based on a refusal to allow pre-trial inspection of certain
photographs and other items in the possession of the prosecution. The
82
court, in affirming, cited Blevins v. State of Georgia,' which held:
There is no statute or rule of procedure of force in this State which requires a solicitor general or other prosecuting officer to make his evidence, documentary or other183
wise, available to the accused or his counsel before trial.

In Ashley v. State of Texas,'8 4 the appellant, who was convicted of murder, claimed a supression of a psychiatric report stating that he was not
competent either at the time of the crime or at the time of the trial. The
state claimed that this was only an opinion, and as such was not required
to be disclosed to the defense. The court refused to accept this conten85
tion and compared this case to United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye:'

177. Supra note 174.
178. Supra note 176, at 719. See Hardin v. State of Texas, 453 S.W.2d 158
(Tex. Crim. App. 1970), which reviews Texas discovery law.
179. 226 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1969).
180. Id. at 471.
181. 224 Ga. 389, 162 S.E.2d 349 (1968).
182. 220 Ga. 720, 141 S.E.2d 426 (1965).
183. Id. at 723, 141 S.E.2d at 429, cited also supra note 181, at 391, 162 S.E.2d
at 350. This same view was upheld in Daniel v. State of Georgia, 118 Ga. App.
370, 163 S.E.2d 863 (1968).
184. 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963).
185. Supra note 147.
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The vice of this argument is that it is not the nature or the weight to be accorded
to an opinion, but the fact that such an opinion had been formed by such an obviously objective witness as one engaged by the prosecution to make the examination. In this respect it falls very much within the concept of the Bye case, where
it was a police officer whose testimony, if elicited, would have been helpful to the
defendant.18 6

In 1968, the Supreme Court of Mississippi gave the defendant the right
to inspect both favorable and non-favorable evidence in certain cases.
In Armstrong v. State of Mississippi,8 7 the appellant was found guilty of
manslaughter and partially based his appeal on a denial of a discovery
motion by the trial court. This court, after citing Brady v. Maryland,18 8
considered the discovery rights of a defendant, and concluded:
[A]lthough the trial judge has discretionary power in determining whether or not
tangible evidence in the possession or under the control of the prosecuting attorney
should be given to the defendant for his inspection, nevertheless, the defendant
should be permitted to inspect tangible evidence which may be used against him
or which may be useful in his defense. This does not mean that a defendant may
peruse the private files of a prosecuting attorney or examine his private notes.
It does mean, however, that the concept of "due process" and "fair trial" requires
that material, tangible evidence must not be concealed from the defendant who is
accused of crime. 189

Sixth Circuit
The discovery procedures for the State of Ohio were discussed intwo
cases, State of Ohio v. White,190 and State of Ohio v. Laskey. 19' In
White, the defendant, convicted of murder, appealed because the trial
court's denied a defense motion to inspect the prior statements of a witness for the prosecution. The court, indiscussing the law of discovery,
pointed out that the "Jencks rule"' 0 2 was not yet binding upon the states.
Furthermore, most jurisdictions are divided on the point of inspection of
prior statements of prosecution witnesses for the purpose of cross exami186. Supra note 184, at 85.
187. 214 So. 2d 589 (Miss. 1968).
188. Supra note 174.
189. Supra note 187, at 596. Other fifth circuit cases worth noting include:
Warren v. Davis, 412 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1969) (evidence allegedly suppressed was
not material to the case); Smith v. State, 282 Ala. 268, 210 So. 2d 826 (1968)
(refusal of broad motion for discovery was affirmed); and Means v. State, 429
S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (all possible evidence should be turned over
to the trial court for a decision as to whether it should be turned over to the defense).
190. 15 Ohio St. 2d 146, 239 N.E.2d 65 (1968).
191. 21 Ohio St. 2d 187, 257 N.E.2d 65 (1970).
192. See discussion accompanying supra note 125.
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nation or impeachment. The court, therefore, proposed an alternativethe in camera inspection-by the trial court, to determine whether or not
any inconsistencies existed, and described the procedure thusly:
A review by the court at which counsel for the state and counsel for the defense
are present and participating. If the judge determines that inconsistencies exist
between the testimony of the witnesses and his prior statements, and such inconsistencies are of so substantial a nature that the demands of a fair trial and due
process require that the defense be permitted to cross examine the witness as to
such inconsistency, the statement should be released to defense counsel. Otherwise, defense counsel is bound under obligation of his oath of office as an attorney
to erase from his mind, and never to use, any information received from the
1 93
in camera inspection.

The court then held that this procedure should have been used by the trial
court and reversed the earlier decision.
In the Laskey case,'94 the defendant claimed that the denial by the
trial court of his motion to examine the grand jury minutes before trial
constituted error. Note that this case is distinguishable from White' 95 in
that White's demand was at trial whereas the instant case involves a pretrial demand. The court, in deciding this case, set forth the criteria for
the production of grand jury minutes prior to trial when it stated:
Generally, proceedings before a grand jury are secret and an accused is not entitled to inspect grand jury minutes before trial for the purpose of preparation or
for purposes of discovery in general. This rule is relaxed only when the ends of
justice require it, such as when the defense shows that a particularized need exists
19 6
for the minutes which outweighs the policy of secrecy.

The court further examined its ruling in the White case and discussed
its impact on a defense request for discovery prior to trial:
The White rule contemplates a limited investigation for the purpose of determining whether inconsistencies exist between a witness' prior statements and his testimony at trial. Such investigation can be made only after the witness testified at
trial, and, generally, can not be used by an accused for ascertaining the evidence of
the prosecution for the purpose of trial preparation. It is a discovery device only
19 7
for the purposes of impeachment upon cross-examination.

In Elliot v. State of Tennessee,198 the defendant, charged with armed
robbery, requested access to any information which the State might
have affecting the credibility, character, conflicting statements or motives
of the State's witnesses. This motion was denied and the defendant ap193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Supra note
Supra note
Supra note
Supra note
Supra note
Tenn. -,
-

130, at 157-58, 239 N.E.2d at 73.
191.
190.
191, at 191, 257 N.E.2d at 68.
191, at 191, 157 N.E.2d at 68.
454 S.W.2d 187 (1970).
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pealed claiming this denial as prejudicial error.

The court held it not

mandatory that evidence of this type be turned over to the defense, nor
must "work product" or oral or written statements be disclosed prior to
trial. In ruling on the specific motion of this case, the court held:
The motives, attitudes . . . are matters that must be determined by such investigation as the party seeking the information deems sufficient and in the absence of
a designation of tangible objects that might tend to shed some light on the area of
investigation the court should not permit a blanket inspection of the files of the
State on the off-chance something "might" be found that "might" help the defendant. Such "fishing expeditions" have not as yet been authorized in Tennessee. 19 9

Seventh Circuit

The problems of discovery and disclosure have arisen in the three state
supreme court decisions within the seventh circuit.

In People v. Cole, 200

the defendant, convicted of rape and robbery, was denied access by the
trial court to certain police reports which contained conflicting statements
made by the prosecutrix and he appealed that denial. Noting that the officers who wrote the report were not called as prosecution witnesses, the
court cited People v. Moses, 201 which stated:
Where it appears that there is evidence in the possession and control of the prosecution favorable to the defendant, a right sense of justice demands that it should
202
be available, unless there are strong reasons otherwise.

The court then ruled upon the merits of this case and upon the fact that
the reporting police officers were not called as witnesses for the prosecution:
The failure of the State to call the two officers to testify concerning the oral
statement of Birdia Jordan cannot be relied upon by the prosecution to evade this
rule. If contradictory statements were made by the prosecuting witness to these
two missing officers then the defendant by all means should have the benefit for
20 3
impeachment purposes. Justice requiresa full and fair disclosure.

A thorough discussion of discovery and disclosure was presented by
the Supreme Court of Indiana in Antrobus v. State of Indiana,20 4 an appeal
following a conviction for burglary. One issue on appeal was the trial
court's denial of certain motions for discovery. The court held that the
State was required to present a list of witnesses to the defense upon re199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at -, 454 S.W.2d at 189.
30 Ill. 2d 375, 196 N.E.2d 691 (1964).
11 Ill. 2d 84, 142 N.E.2d 1 (1957).
Supra note 200, at 381, 196 N.E.2d at 694.
Supra note 200, at 381, 196 N.E.2d at 694-95.
20 Ind. 164, 254 N.E.2d 873 (1970).
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quest, citing Bernard v. State of Indiana,2 0 5 which set forth the criteria and
justification for the production of such a list:
It is self-evident that a list of witnesses would have been beneficial in the preparation of appellant's case. We do not require that the State lay bare its case in advance of trial nor that the criminal defendant be allowed a fishing expedition, howis requested and the State
ever these objections do not arise when a list of witnesses
20 6
jails to show a paramount interest in nondisclosure.

Presenting a detailed analysis of the criteria for obtaining production of
a witness's pre-trial statements, the court stated:
First, the defendant must lay the proper foundation for his motion or the trial court
may properly deny it. An adequate foundation is layed when: (1) The witness
whose statement is sought has testified on direct examination; (2) A substantially
verbatem transcription of statements made by the witness prior to trial is shown to
probably be within the control of the prosecution; and, (3) The statements relate to
matters covered in the witness' testimony in the present case. If the foundation is
proper the trial court must grant the motion (for production) and order the statements turned directly over to the defendant unless the State alleges: (a) There are
no such statements within the control of the State. The trial court must conduct a
hearing on the conflicting claims of the parties to resolve this issue. (b) There is
a necessity for keeping the contents of the statement confidential. (c) The statement also contains matter not related to the matters covered in witness' testimony
and the State does not wish to reveal that portion. In the latter two cases the
but should be given to the
statements need not be given directly to the defendant
20 7
trial court for his decision concerning the State's claim.

The court then went on to apply its rule to the disclosure of grand
jury statements: "We believe that the above rule applies to statements
made by the witness to the grand jury as well as statements made to
law enforcement agents of the State. .... ,,208
In the Wisconsin case of State of Wisconsin v. Miller,20 9 the defendant
had been convicted of sexual intercourse with a child and appealed. At
the close of the child's testimony, the defense requested and the court denied, the production of whatever records the State might have concerning
the child's mental condition. This court, noting that there was no Wisconsin pre-trial discovery statute, affirmed the conviction:
Further, Wisconsin does not recognize a right in defendant to pretrial discovery of
the prosecution's evidence. If we are to adopt a pretrial discovery procedure in
rule of court or by
criminal cases in this state we deem it would be best done by a 210
legislative action rather than on a case to case basis by the court.
205.
206.
207.
208.

248 Ind. 688, 230 N.E.2d 536 (1967).
Id. at 692-93, 230 N.E.2d at 540, cited at 254 N.E.2d at 874-75.
Supra note 204, at 170, 254 N.E.2d at 876-77.
Supra note 204, at 173, 254 N.E.2d at 878.

209.

35 Wis. 2d 454, 151 N.W.2d 157 (1967).

210. Id. at 458, 151 N.W.2d at 169. See People v. Rose, 43 Ill. 2d 273,
253 N.E.2d 456 (1969) (certain blood tests were held not material to the case).
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Eighth Circuit
The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed that state's law of pretrial discovery in State of Iowa v. Eads,211 a certiorari proceeding to review the
trial court's order directing the State to produce certain statements, reports,
photographs and physical evidence for the defendant's inspection prior to
his murder trial. In its decision, the court first spoke of the defendant's right to inspect evidentiary information:
It is true that we have held discovery is not available to one charged with a crime (citation omitted) ....

However, that does not deny a defendant access to all evi-

dentiary information which is in possession of the State and which is necessary to as212
sure him a fair trial.

The court, in distinguishing documentary evidence from physical evidence, further stated:
In State v. White, we said a defendant is entitled to know the contents of a document
the State intends to use against him. We believe this applies with equal force to his
right to know the physical characteristics of real evidence the State expects to use
against him.

213

As to the instant case, the court held:
1) . . .defendant was entitled to a copy of the autopsy report. .

.

. 2) The defend-

ant was entitled to an F.B.I. report of its analysis of items of physical evidence ...
3) The trial court abused its discretion in ordering the State to deliver copies of the
214
statements of all witnesses expected to testify at defendant's trial.

In a separate opinion, Justice Becker stated that the statements of "witnesses who the State indicated would not be used at trial, should be turned

'215
over to the defense.
The Supreme Court of Missouri has dealt extensively with the question
2
of pre-trial discovery and disclosure. In State of Missouri v. Aubuchon, 10
an appeal following a conviction for first degree robbery, the court considered instances where discovery would be allowed. Having first stated
the Missouri general rule on discovery, the court pointed out that there

was no general right presented its reasons for that belief:
There is no general right of discovery by statute or rule in Missouri in criminal
cases. . . . The State is not permitted in any possible way to discover facts from a
defendant; we are unwilling to open up, carte blanche, the files of the State to the defendant. We have reached the point in our criminal jurisprudence where we should
211. 166 N.W.2d 766 (Iowa 1969).
212. Id. at 768.
213. Id. at 772.
214. Id. at 772-74.
215. Id. at 775.
216. 381 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1964).
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consider, and balance, the rights of the public against some of the recently pressed
217
rights of the defendant.

However, the court then tempered this statement when it further held:
We hold now that, if there is a satisfactory showing that a report or statement of a
witness in the hands of the State is of such a nature that without it, the defendant's trial would be fundamentally unfair, then it should be produced; otherwise
not .... 218

In State of Missouri v. Blevins, 219 the defendant appealed following his

conviction for first degree robbery. He claimed error in the trial court's
denial of his request for a subpoena duces tecum for a certain police report.
Defense counsel argued that the request was based upon a "feeling" that
there would be conflicting statements about the identity of the defendant
and wished the report for impeachment purposes. This court upheld the
trial court when it found:
The record does not demonstrate any sufficient reason for the production of the report; the motion was one in the nature of a "fishing expedition.". . . The police
report was not used in any way at the trial by any witness. Under these circumstances, there was certainly no "plain error" in the denial of the motion. The point
220
is without merit.

An example of what must be shown to obtain discovery and a discussion of "fishing expeditions" is to be found in State of Missouri v. Yates,221
where, following a conviction for illegal sale of a stimulant drug, the defendant appealed. He argued that the destruction of certain film showing
his arrest and the denial of an all-encompassing discovery motion
amounted to prejudicial error. The court first ruled that there was no
showing that the film ".

. would have demonstrated his innocence, de-

picted any fact favorable to his defense, impeached any state witness on
any material fact, or reveal(ed) any fact not testified to orally. '222 The
court then referred to State of Missouri v. Aubuchon, 223 and ruled that
the discovery motion was in the nature of a fishing expedition and as
such, there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying
such a motion. Concurring in result only, Judge Seiler attacked the majority for denying the defendant's right to go on a fishing expedition:
The first essential of the rule is the existence of favorable evidence in the hands of the
prosecution. If the evidence exists it does so regardless of whether the defendant
knows of it. . . . Whether he is attempting a "fishing expedition" or knows exactly
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 813-14.
Id. at 814.
421 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. 1967).
Id. at 268.
442 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. 1969).
Id. at 23.
Supra note 216.

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXI

what the police have does not change the basic constitutional principle that the
prosecution cannot fail to disclose favorable information and that if it does, the fail224
ure will invalidate the conviction.

In State of Nebraska v. Davis, 225 the defendant was convicted of first
degree murder and appealed. At the trial the defendant was denied discovery of reports of examinations and scientific tests relating to blood and
hair found at the scene of the crime. There were no witnesses and the
conviction was based on physical and circumstantial evidence. The
court restated the Nebraska law of discovery:
[T]he trial court has a broad discretion in ruling upon a discovery motion, but that

22
such a motion should be granted where required by the interests of justce. 6
The scientific evidence in this case was of particular importance because it tended to
22 7
disprove any theory of accidental death.

as well as other
The court ruled that the denial of the discovery motion
2 28
acts were prejudicial error and reversed the conviction.
Ninth Circuit
The defendant in State of Arizona v. Fowler,229 appealed a conviction of first degree murder. At the trial he asserted self defense, claiming
the decendent was the aggressor and had a knife. A knife was found a
short time later near the scene of the crime but its existence was concealed
from the defense by the prosecution. The State contended there was insufficient foundation to make the knife admissible as evidence. The
Supreme Court of Arizona pointed out that the sufficiency of the foundation was not a matter for the prosecution's unilateral determination, citing United States v. Griffin,230 and reversed the earlier decision in dewas both material and reletermining that the knife which was suppressed
231
vant to the defendant's plea of self defense.
In People v. Dickerson,23 2 the appellant appealed from a conviction of
224. Supra note 221, at 29.
225. 185 Neb. 433, 176 N.W.2d 657 (1970).
226. State v. Reichel, 184 Neb. 194, 165 N.W.2d 743 (1969).
227. Supra note 225, at 443, 176 N.W.2d at 663.
228. See State v. Berry, 451 S.W.2d 144 (Mo. 1970) (Sup. Ct. Rule 25 does
not authorize blanket request for all material in the possession of the prosecution);
State v. Davis, supra note 225 (requiring police officers to disclose the name of an
informant in a matter resting within the discretion of the trial court); and State v.
Reichel, supra note 226 (trial court has broad discretion in ruling upon a discovery
motion and that motion should be granted when required by the interest of justice).
229. 101 Ariz. 561, 422 P.2d 125 (1967).
230. 183 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
231. Supra note 229, at 564, 422 P.2d at 128.
232. 75 Cal. App. 2d 352, 75 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1969).

19711

COMMENTS

459

illegal sale of marijuana, claiming an illegal suppression of evidence in
that he did not receive all the police reports held in the prosecution's files.
In affirming the conviction, the court reviewed pre-trial discovery procedures and ruled that the appellant had failed to be specific enough in
his request:
There is no question but that under modem procedure a defendant is entitled, after
proper application, to secure information in the hands of the prosecuting officials in
order to prepare for trial; however, this does not mean that the defense is released
from the necessity of a specification of what it wants. If the defense states only in
general terms that it wants to see everything in the hands of the district attorney or
the police that bears on the case, this all-purpose demand need not be granted.
There must be at least a reasonable specificity as to what is required and a plausible
233
justification for the production of relevant writings.

In State v. Tyler, 23 4 the Supreme Court of Washington gave the trial
courts great latitude in deciding whether or not to grant the pre-trial production of written statements of witnesses:
Whether the court will direct the production of written statements of witnesses in advance of trial, or at all, is a matter peculiarly within the trial court's discretion, and its
ruling on that point will be disturbed only when there has been a manifest abuse of
23 5
that discretion.

The Montana Code of Criminal Procedure, 236 requires that a defendant
who intends to rely upon self-defense, insanity, or alibi to give the
prosecution notice of the defense and defense witnesses. This statute
was challenged in State of Montana ex rel. Sikora v. District Court of

13th Judicial District,237 where the court upheld the statute while avoiding a direct consideration of the problem of pre-trial discovery. In so
avoiding that issue, the court stated that "[s]uch pretrial discovery in
criminal cases is now in the evolutionary stage and each case must of
necessity face the constitutional questions that arise, when and if they are
raised during trial."

' 23 8

Tenth Circuit
The court of appeals for the tenth circuit, discussed the constitutional
233. Id. at 359, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
234. 77 Wash. 2d 726, 466 P.2d 120 (1970).
235. Id. at 736, 466 P.2d at 126.
236. MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 95-1803(D) (1947).
237. 154 Mont. 241, 462 P.2d 897 (1969).
238. Id. at 246, 462 P.2d at 900. For other ninth circuit cases see, People v.
Chapman, 52 Cal. 2d 95, 338 P.2d 428 (1959) (to obtain written statement of
witness, no need to show any prior inconsistencies), and People v. Brawley, 82 Cal.
Rptr., 161, 461 P.2d 361 (1969) (evidence not material to guilt due to California
conspiracy laws but was material as to punishment).
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impact of Jencks v. United States, 2 9 in Hill v. Crouse,2 40 where the petitioner had appealed following a district court's denial of a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. The appellant contended that the Jencks decision was applicable to the states, but the court ruled that the Jencks decision was not based upon constitutional rights: "[w]e must conclude that
the trial court correctly held that the petition did not raise any federal
24 1
Constitutional question and that the order of dismissal was proper."
In Rapue v. People,242 the defendant, who was convicted of taking
indecent liberties with a fifteen year old boy, claimed the trial court erred
in refusing a defense request to compel the district attorney to produce for
inspection the notes which the district attorney had made in an interview
with the young boy. In affirming the lower court decision, the court ruled
that: "Colo. R. Crim. P. 16 does not cover or include the "work sheets"
of a district attorney made by him in preparation for trial. ' 243
The question of the prosecution's "work product" was also considered
in State of Kansas v. Lemon, 244 where the defendant appealed from a conviction of receiving stolen goods. One point of appeal was the State's
failure to supply the appellant with copies of the witnesses' pretrial statements contained within certain reports held by the State. The court discussed the disclosure of investigative reports:
This court has heretofore held that a report compiled by a law enforcement agency
in the course of its investigation into a criminal offense is quasi-private in character,
and it was not error for the trial court to refuse a defendant's motion to require the
state to produce such a report in court for the defendant's inspection and use in
cross-examination of a witness whose statement was contained therein. 24 5

In State of New Mexico v. Turner,246 the defendant, convicted of aggravated burglary and rape, appealed the denial of a motion for the trial
court to inspect the State's files for any exculpatory evidence not made
available to the defense. The defendant contended that he had no way
of knowing if any evidence had been suppressed. The Court viewed the
defendant's request as "fishing expedition," and in affirming the conviction held:
Defendant's claim simply is that he doesn't know whether the State has complied
with his demand for exculpatory material; that because he doesn't know, the trial
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

353 U.S. 657 (1957).
360 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 604.
171 Colo. 324, 466 P.2d 925 (1970).
Id. at 328, 466 P.2d at 927.
203 Kan. 464, 454 P.2d 718 (1969).
Id. at 470, 454 P.2d at 723.
81 N.M. 571, 469 P.2d 720 (1970).
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court should check on the truth of the State's response. In essence, defendant wants
the court to go on a "fishing expedition." (citation omitted.) Since defendant is
not entitled to such an expedition himself, the trial court did not err in refusing to
undertake such an expedition. On defendant's behalf, absent some showing, or indication, that a right of defendant has been or would be violated. . . . There being
247
no such showing or indication, the point is without merit.

District of Columbia
In Levin v. Katzenbach,24s the appellate court for the District of Colum-

bia specified what evidence must be disclosed to the defendant in stating:
"Thus appellant would be entitled to relief in the present case if the government failed to disclose evidence which, in the context of this case, might
'249
have led the jury to entertain a reasonabledoubt about appellant's guilt.
WHERE THE DEFENDANT ALREADY HAS KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS
INTRODUCTION

Is it possible for evidence to be suppressed when the defendant has
prior knowledge of the facts or items allegedly suppressed? Generally,
the courts have held that there can be no suppression when the defendant
has prior knowledge. However, several questions arise when one attempts
to apply this rule of law to a given set of facts. For example, what is the
legal effect of the defendant not communicating his knowledge of material
facts to his attorney, thus rendering this information useless to his defense? Is it possible that knowledge may be imputed from the defendant
to his attorney? May knowledge be inferred from the words, actions, or
deeds of the defendant or his attorney? These questions shall be considered in this section as well as a review of the doctrine of defense knowl2 50
edge as applied throughout the various circuits.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS

The United States Supreme Court has not yet commented on the question of the defendant's prior knowledge in relation to a suppression of evidence case.
247. Id. at 573, 469 P.2d at 722. See also State v. Tackett, 78 N.M. 450, 432
P.2d 415 (1967) (discussion and rationale against defense "fishing expeditions").
248. 363 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
249. Id. at 291. See also Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d at 1212, for a reiteration of
this holding.
250. Cases from the 6th and D.C. circuits have not been cited within this
section.
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INTERPRETATIONS WITHIN THE CIRCUITS

FirstCircuit
The court of appeals for the first circuit considered the problem of prior
knowledge in United States v. DeLeo,25' where the defendant appealed a
conviction for federal bank robbery. One issue raised on appeal was an
inconsistency in a bank teller's description of the robber and his gun to
the local police and the F.B.I. It was shown that the appellant knew of
the inconsistencies as to the color of the gun, prior to trial, and, therefore,
the court held:
[W]e cannot say that the prosecutor's failure to disclose them amounts to reversible
error. Defense counsel learned of the inconsistency concerning the color of the gun
prior to trial and introduced testimony at trial concerning the inconsistency. Thus,
even assuming it was material-which we doubt-there is no possible prejudice to ap252
pellant arising from the nondisclosure.

Second Circuit
In United States v. Roberts, 253 the defendant, convicted of unlawful sale
of heroin, objected to the denial of his motion for a new trial. He alleged
in his appeal that the Government suppressed certain favorable evidence,
namely the location of a certain witness, who had given two statements to
Government agents investigating the case. The court found prior knowledge on defendant Robert's part and affirmed, stating that "Roberts knew
Robinson's identity and his potential importance as a witness; moreover,
Roberts himself alleged that before trial 'a friend' told him that Robinson was in a city jail. ....254 The court further ruled that Robinson's
information was harmful and not helpful to the defense, thus further emphasizing the lack of prejudice to the appellant.
In People v. Rosenberg,255 the defendant, tried and convicted of murder, had knowledge of the results of certain tests, but he failed to communicate those results to his attorney. On appeal, the defendant's attorney claimed a suppression of evidence in that the State did not apprise him
of the results of the tests. Responding to this allegation, the Court stated:
If the defendant did not inform his attorneys, then it is his responsibility and he

must bear the legal consequences. He may not now complain about the suppression
251.

422 F.2d 487 (1st Cir. 1970).

252.

Id. at 498-99.

253.

388 F.2d 646 (2nd Cir. 1968).

254.

Id. at 648.

255.

59 Misc. 2d 1, 297 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1969).
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of evidence of which he had knowledge but which he did not communicate to counsel. 256

Third Circuit
The third circuit considered defendant's prior knowledge in United
States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 257 where it ruled that "Evidence is not
suppressed or withheld if the accused has knowledge of the facts or circumstances or if they otherwise become available to him during the
trial., 258
In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Osborne,26 2 the defendant was
convicted of murder, appealed alleging a suppression of evidence by the
prosecution. He complained that he was not allowed to inspect certain
investigative reports which showed inconsistencies in a witness's statements. The facts showed that at the preliminary hearing the witness had
stated that the defendant had left his house on the day in question, whereas
the witness had given the defense a written statement that the defendant
had stayed home on that day. The defense counsel read both the testimony at the hearing and the written statement into the record and both
were used at trial. The court, citing Rosenberg v. United States, 2 0 to
show a lack of prejudice against the defendant, ruled:
In view of the fact that the same inconsistencies revealed in Skeete's interviews with
the police was already known to defendant's counsel by virtue' of Skeete's testimony

at the preliminary hearing and of his signed statement given to such counsel's own
law clerk, we are unable to say that the failure of the Government to make available
to defendant or his counsel the reports in the possession of the police violated due
process .... 261

In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Osborne,2 6 2 the defendant was
convicted of second-degree murder and appealed. The failure of the
Commonwealth to produce, at trial, the bullets which inflicted the fatal
wounds was raised on appeal. The defendant contended this was an act
of suppression and a denial of due process of law; however, the court,
noting that the defense counsel had known of the presence of the bullets
but failed to call for their production at the trial, held:
Unlike the trial counsel in Almeida, appellant's trial counsel knew of the existence of
the bullets and knew what to ask for. Under these circumstances it cannot be said
256.

Id. at 3, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 863.

257. 221 F.2d 763 (3rd Cir. 1955).

258. Id. at 767.
259.
260.
261.
262.

410 F.2d 307 (3rd Cir. 1969).
360 U.S. 367 (1959).
Supra note 259, at 311.
433 Pa. 297, 249 A.2d 330 (1969).
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that the district attorney deliberately suppressed the bullets simply because he failed
2
to introduce them. 68

Fourth Circuit
Two Maryland state cases illustrate the problem of a defense allegation of suppression when it can be shown that the defense had knowledge of the allegedly suppressed items. In Hyde v. Warden of Maryland
Penitentiary,264 defendant had been convicted of murder and appealed,
alleging an illegal suppression of certain physical evidence. In motion at
the trial, the appellant had moved for a suppression of the evidence, claiming that it was illegally seized. The court took note of that motion and
then ruled ". . . in view of Hyde's knowledge of these articles, this con265
tention was not supportable."
In Duffin v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary,266 the defendant had
been found guilty of assault with intent to murder and assault and battery.
He alleged in his appeal that there was a suppression of evidence, specifically, a knife taken from the prosecuting witness which had not been
placed in evidence by the prosecution. The facts showed that the defendant knew of the knife and also knew that it was in the possession of
the police. In affirming the decision, the court declared:
Duffin had full knowledge with regard to the knife and its custody long before his
trial. . . . It would seem clear that the defendant had ample opportunity, had he
so desired, to have put the knife in evidence on cross-examinaton or otherwise,
through either Loretta J. Mahoney or the police officer. In view of the above statement by Duffin and in view of the other facts just stated, we see no foundation for a
26 7
claim of suppression or concealment of evidence by the State.

Fifth Circuit
In Conyers v. Wainwright,26s a proceeding on a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, the petitioner claimed a suppression of evidence by the
prosecution. The evidence allegedly suppressed were certain hospital records showing the treatment of the petitioner after his arrest. The court
considered the merits of the case and then stated its rule concerning suppression where there is knowledge on the part of the defendant:
The record shows that both the petitioner and his trial counsel knew of the existence
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. at 300, 249 A.2d at 332.
235 Md. 641, 202 A.2d 382 (1964).
Id. at 645, 202 A.2d at 384.
224 Md. 645, 167 A.2d 601 (1961).
Id. at 647, 167 A.2d at 602.
309 F.Supp. 1101 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
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of the records. It cannot be said that the records were suppressed. . . . Once the
evidence is made known to defense counsel the prosecutor's burden is eliminated. 269

In Harris v. State of Texas,270 the defendant was convicted of robbery

and appealed, alleging suppression of reports made by the police officers
who investigated the offense. The officers were not called as witnesses at
the trial. The court found nothing in the record to show that the defendant or his counsel did not know of the reports or that they were not allowed to inspect the reports, and, therefore, ruled that "[i]f such facts
were known to appellant or his trial counsel, he cannot now seek relief on
the basis of the State's failure to disclose the same facts." '271
In Means v. State of Texas, 272 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
emphasized the possibility of indirect knowledge resulting in the denial of
relief for an alleged suppression of evidence by the prosecution. In that
trial for murder with malice, the prosecutor informed a newspaperman
about the results of certain tests which were possibly exculpatory to the
defendant. The defense counsel learned of these results, not from the
prosecution, but by reading of them in a newspaper while the jury was
engaged in deliberation. The court, in affirming, stated:
We cannot conclude that appellant has shown he did not know the results of this
test prior to the receipt of the jury verdict. It appears that prior to the receipt of the
jury's verdict that the results of the tests by virtue of newspaper coverage was a matter of some public knowledge in Harris County and if having learned of such test the
appellant could have moved the court to allow him to reopen in order to introduce
such evidence. . . . We find no evidence in the record that appellant ever made
such request . . . reversible error is not shown in view of the fact that appellant
has failed to show that he did not know the results of the test involved before the receipt of the jury verdict at this one stage trial. 273

Seventh Circuit
In People v. Raymond, 27 4 the defendant had been found guilty of rape
and robbery. Tests were made of his clothing which proved negative as
to the presence of spermatozoa or other extracts. Although the defendant was aware of the results of the tests, he failed to inform his attorney.

In affirming, the court held:
269. Id. at 1105.
270. 453 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
271. Id. at 839.
272. 429 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
273. Id. at 495-96. Another 5th circuit case on point is Diamond v. State, 233
So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1970) (existence of alleged accomplice should have been known
by defendant arrested at the same time).
274. 42 Ill. 2d 564, 248 N.E.2d 663(1969).
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[W]here a defendant is fully informed as to matter possessed by the State which
would not necessarily be exculpatory, and does not exhibit any interest in its procurement until after he has been found guilty, no deprivation of due process has been
shown.

27 5

Eighth Circuit
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has ruled that a defendant may
preclude his subsequent claim of a suppression of evidence by objecting
276
to the introduction of certain items. In State of Nebraska v. Reichel,
the defendant objected to the State's attempted use of a report comparing
dirt samples taken from the defendant's clothes and dirt collected at the
scene of the crime. The court ruled there was no suppression of evidence,
stating: "[I]t cannot be said that the State suppressed the report in view
of the attempt of the State to show the results of the tests and what the report stated during the cross-examination of the deputy county attor27 7
ney."
Ninth Circuit
The petitioner in Thomas v. United States,27 81 was convicted of interstate transportation of forged securities and appealed, asserting that the
prosecution had suppressed the testimony of another who had admitted
that he had taken two guns from the car in which appellant was alleged
to have stolen the securities. It was pointed out that Thomas' attorney
knew of this witness before the trial and demonstrated this knowledge at
the trial. The court, therefore, found that no suppression existed, stating:
"Thus there was no concealment or suppression of evidence, willful or
otherwise. Counsel for Thomas had the information from the Government
in time to call Liday as a witness or at least arrange for his deposition." 27 9
Tenth Circuit
In Butt v. Graham, 280 defendant was convicted of carnal knowledge and
appealed, alleging suppression of the results of an examination of the
prosecutrix taken by a private physician. The report tended to be favorable to the appellant, although it was not conclusive. While the defend275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. at 568, 248 N.E.2d at 665.
Supra note 226.
Supra note 226, at 196, 165 N.W.2d at 744.
343 F.2d 49 (9th Cir. 1965).
Id. at 54-55.
6 Utah 2d 133, 307 P.2d 892 (1957).
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ant claimed that he knew nothing of this report, it was subsequently shown
that his trial attorney was aware of the report and furthermore, the trial
attorney testified that he had discussed the matter with the defendant.
The court found:
In view of all the evidence on this point, the court was justified in finding that appellant had knowledge of this examination before his trial. This evidence was as
available to him as it was to the prosecuting attorney, and, therefore, the court did
not err in finding there was no suppression of material evidence by the prosecuting at281
torney amounting to a denial of due process.

The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled in Brown v.
Crouse,28 2 that where there is knowledge on the part of the defense there
can be no suppression. Appealing the denial of a motion for a writ of
habeas corpus, defendant urged as error an alleged suppression of a doctor's
report following the doctor's examination of a rape victim. The court upheld the district court's finding of no suppression because there was evidence that the existence of the reports had been known by the defense
counsel, had been made available to the defense, and had been men283
tioned by the defense at the trial but had not been produced.
NEGLIGENT SUPPRESSION BY THE PROSECUTION
INTRODUCTION

In previous sections, attention has been directed to an intentional act of
misconduct by the prosecution. It was usually alleged that the prosecution intentionally suppressed the evidence or failed to fully disclose the
exculpatory evidence sought, but not received, by the defense. This section considers the determination and effect of negligent suppression. For
example, what is the legal effect of negligent suppression by the prosecution? What tests are used to determine if the suppression is intentional,
negligent, or excusable? Is a "reasonable man" test applicable or should
the court apply a different criterion? Whose responsibility is it to remain
free from negligence-the prosecution, the police, or both? In the few
recorded cases on point cited in this chapter, these questions shall be ex284
plored and discussed.
UNITED STATES SUPREME

COURT INTERPRETATIONS

As in previous areas of prosecutorial misconduct, reference must again
281. Id. at 135, 307 P.2d at 893.
282. 425 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1970).
283. Id. at 309.
284. Cases from the 1st, 3rd, and 6th circuits have not been cited in this section.
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be made to Brady v. Maryland.2 85 In Brady, the Court found a denial
due process when there was suppression of evidence "irrespective
the good or bad faith of the prosecution. '286 The Court went further
considering the role of the prosecutor in terms of negligence when
stated:

of
of
in
it

A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made
available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial
that bears heavily on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with the standards of justice, even
though, as in the present case, his action is not "the result of guile"....28T

The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Augenblick,2 8 8 excused the loss of certain tape recordings by the Government. Although
most courts hold that the loss of material evidence is tantamount to a
negligent suppression of evidence, the Court here ruled:
There is no doubt but that the tapes were covered by the Jencks Act; and an earnest
effort was made to locate them. Their nature and existence were the subject of detailed interrogation at the pretrial hearing convened at the request of the defense.
Four government agents testified concerning the interrogation of Hodges, the recording facilities used, the Navy's routine in handling and using such recordings, and the
fate of the -tape containing Hodge's testimony. The ground was covered once again
at the court martial. The tapes were not produced; the record indeed shows that
they were not found; and their ultimate fate remains a mystery. The law officer
properly ruled that the Government bore the burden of producing them or explaining
why it could not do so. The record is devoid of credibile evidence that they were
289
suppressed.
INTERPRETATIONS WITHIN THE CIRCUITS

Second Circuit

of negligent supThe Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit spoke
2 90
pression and its implications in United States v. Keogh:
There remains a third category of cases-where the suppression was not deliberate
in either of the senses we have included and no request was made, but where hindsight discloses that the defense could have put the evidence to not insignificant use.
While we do not dispute that relief may sometimes be granted even in such cases,
29 1
the standard of materiality must be considerably higher.
285.
286.
287.
288.

373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Id. at 87.
Id. at 87-88.
393 U.S. 348 (1969).

289. Id. at 355-56.
290.
291.

391 F.2d 138 (2nd Cir. 1968).

Id. at 147.
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The court then differentiated between misjudgment and prosecutorial misconduct as it further stated:
Failure to appreciate the use to which the defense could place evidence in the prosecution's hands, or forgetfulpess that it exists when a development in the trial has
given it a new importance, are quite different. . . . To invalidate convictions in
such cases because a combing of the prosecutors' files after the trial has disclosed
evidence possibly useful to the defense but not likely to have changed the verdict
29 2
would create unbearable burdens and uncertainties.

Fourth Circuit
In Barbee v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary,293 the prosecution
claimed that there could be no suppression since there was no showing
that the prosecuting attorney had any knowledge of the existence of the
allegedly suppressed report. The court referred to this point and to negligence of public officials other than those engaged in the actual prosecution when it declared:
Nor is the effect of the nondisclosure neutralized because the prosecuting attorney
was not shown to have had knowledge of the exculpatory evidence. Failure of the
police to reveal such material evidence in their possession is equally harmful to a defendant whether the information is purposely, or negligently, withheld. And it makes
no difference if the withholding is by officials other than the prosecutor. . . . If
the police silence as to the existence of the reports resulted from negligence rather
29 4
than guile, the deception is no less damaging.

Fifth Circuit
In Conyers v. Wainwright,29 5 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, Miami Division, held that knowledge of evidence in the hands of certain public officials could not be imputed to the
prosecution. Here, the prosecution had no actual knowledge of certain
suppressed medical records, and the only persons with knowledge of these
records were members of the Sheriff's department. The court considering
the relationship between the sheriff and the prosecution, ruled that,
"[w]hile still a branch of the state, the Sheriff here was merely the jailkeeper and had nothing to do with the prosecution of the case.

' 29 6

How-

ever, a direct confrontation with the issue of negligence was avoided when
it further stated: "It is not necessary to decide whether the prosecutors
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id. at 148.
331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964).
Id. at 846.
Supra note 268.
Supra note 268, at 1104.
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should have known of the records because the facts of this case do not
establish any suppression."...297
Seventh Circuit
In United States v. Poole,298 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
determined that when the prosecution failed to correct the testimony of
the prosecutrix and to assist the defense in locating the doctor who had
examined the prosecutrix, the defense's case was prejudiced to the extent
that a new trial was necessary. The court first found that the suppression
was not intentional and then outlined the criteria for awarding a reversal
in cases of negligent suppression:
There can be no claim on this record that the government counsel's conduct was in
bad faith . . . In the absence of such conduct, a showing of prejudice has generally
been a prerequisite for relief in collateral proceedings on a claim of failure to disclose unrequested exculpatory information .. .We think Poole's burden of showing
prejudice on appeal, as distinguished from the burden in collateral proceedings, is
satisfied by the serious doubt we have that he received a fundamentally fair trial, free
299
from prejudice.

In Hale v. State of Indiana,0 0 the defendant was convicted of assault and battery with intent to gratify sexual desires on a twelve-year-old
girl, and appealed. He claimed a suppression of evidence by the police
who threw away a pair of panties found in the back of the defendant's
truck, where the alleged incident took place. The defendant claimed
that the panties belonged to another person and the prosecution contended that they belonged to the assaulted young girl. The defendant further contended that the panties would not have fit the young girl, but, because the police threw the panties away, it was impossible to prove that
contention. Although the court affirmed because of the defendant's failure to demonstrate the materiality of the destroyed evidence, it nonetheless still agreed that negligent suppression is grounds for reversal and further enunciated its beliefs on the subject:
We agree that the negligent destruction or withholding of material evidence by the
police or the prosecution presents grounds for reversal. 30 1 [W]e fail to see any valid
basis for distinction between negligent failure to disclose or negligent destruction
from intentional destruction or intentional non-disclosure as long as the interest to
02
be protected is that of the defendant's right to a fair trial and due process.3
297.
298.

Supra note 268, at 1104-05.
379 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1967).

299.

Id. at 648.

300.
301.
302.

248 Ind. 630, 230 N.E.2d 432 (1967).
Id. at 634, 230 N.E.2d at 435.
Id. at 634-35, 230 N.E.2d at 435 n.l.
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Eighth Circuit

The Supreme Court of Iowa has yet to equate negligent nondisclosure
with a denial of due process of law. In State of Iowa v. Thomas,30 3 the
defendant was found guilty of manslaughter. On appeal, the defendant
asserted two grounds for reversal: (1) that the State withheld unfavorable testimony by its failure to call a doctor who had prepared a case history of the decedent, and (2) that the State suppressed evidence in its
failure to fully investigate a possible lead given it by the defense counsel.
The court analogized this situation to Levin v. Katzenbach,3°4 where
negligent nondisclosure was held to be a denial of due process of law and
went on to state:
We recognize there may be instances in which a defendant's right to due process of law may be violated by concealment of material evidence, but this is certainly not one of them. The fact that we quote from Levine v. Katzenbach, supra,
should not be interpreted as approving the theory of negligent nondisclosure. We
need not pass upon that question here. ... 305

Ninth Circuit

In Lessard v. Dickson,30 6 the court of appeals for the ninth circuit
considered the problems raised by the nondisclosure of fact which occurred
two years prior to arrest. After conviction for first-degree murder and a
denial of habeas corpus by the district court, the defendant appealed,
claiming that the prosecution suppressed the statement of a telephone operator at the motel of the deceased, who stated that she saw a different
man visit the deceased earlier in the evening in question. Two years
passed between the time of the death and the petitioner's arrest. The defense did not learn of this statement until the trial ended, at which time
the prosecuting attorney reviewed his file with the defendant's new attorney. The court cited the Supreme Court of California's earlier opinion
and concluded that it was correct in distinguishing the responsibilities of
the prosecution with respect to a deliberate versus negligent suppression:
Due process does not require that officers, two years after the discovery of the information, must remember facts that have become stale with time and that they must
sua sponte disclose them to the petitioner or his attorneys. We cannot find that
the prosecution 'deliberately suppressed' evidence which long before they had considered to be unreliable or that failure to resuscitate such forgotten statements 'was a
material deception' and that there was knowledge thereof on the part of the prose307
cuting officer ....
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

162 N.W.2d 724 (Iowa 1968).
363 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Supra note 303, at 729.
394 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 91.
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Note that there was a strong dissent entered by Judge Ely. 08
In Peoples v. Hocker,10 9 the defense contended that inadequate police
procedures amounted to a denial of due process of law. Here, it was
claimed that the police should have taken tests that would have determined whether the deceased was shot by defendant or by herself. The
court first stated that "[i]t would be an exceedingly delicate task to endeavor to establish a criteria to tell when a certain quantum of police
investigation constitutes due process and when it does not."8 10 The court
then ruled that while a better investigation would have been more helpful
to the jury, the investigation actually made was not so poor as to deny the
defendant due process or amount to a suppression of evidence as found
in Brady v. Maryland.311
In State of Arizona v. Maloney, 1

2

the defendant was convicted of two

counts of murder and appealed. He asserted that he has having sexual
intercourse with his mother when his step-father came into the room and
in a struggle both his mother and step-father were killed. He claimed that
his step-father killed his mother and that he killed his step-father in selfdefense. One point of the appeal alleged was a negligent suppression of
evidence by the police who found a used condom and condom box in the
bedroom but discarded both. In answering, the court applied a "reasonable man" test to the actions of the police:
They could not then have known that defendant was to later claim that his stepfather had discovered him and his mother in an act of sexual intercourse. Nor
could they have known, and there was nothing to put them on notice at the time,
that such evidence might tend to exonerate the accused. Certainly the destruction
3 13
thereof was not the result of guile.

The court then considered possible ramifications of following the defendant's contentions as to the "negligent" actions of the police:
If the argument here advanced by the defendant were to prove successful, would we
not hereafter be requiring all investigating officers, at their peril, to bring the entire crime scene, "lock, stock, and barrel," including the ceiling, floor, and walls,
into court? . ..The principle urged could well lead to deliberate fabrication on the
part of an accused after learning what items officers had discarded or failed to pre8 14
serve.
308. Id. at 93.
309. 423 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1970).
310. Id. at 964.
311. Id. at 964.
312. 105 Ariz. 348, 464 P.2d 793 (1970).
313. id. at 351, 464 P.2d at 796.
314. Id. at 352, 464 P.2d at 797. Other 9th circuit cases on negligent suppression include Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795 (C.D. Calif. 1969) (a conviction cannot stand where the prosecution has, either willfully or negligently,
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Tenth Circuit
The Supreme Court of New Mexico has considered assertions charging
both negligent suppression, stemming from the loss of evidence by the
prosecution, and faulty investigation by the investigating officers. In
Trimble v. State of New Mexico,8 18 the defendant was convicted of first
degree murder. Although fourteen separate points were cited by the defendant for reversal, the court dealt only with the first-the handling of
certain evidence by the prosecutor's office and the police department.
The evidence in question consisted of a letter and some twenty rolls of
magnetic tape which supported the defendant's self-defense story. However, the letter and all four copies of it were lost, and some of the tapes
were missing for a time but were later returned. The court ruled that this
mishandling of the evidence was tantamount to an illegal suppression of
evidence, basing its ruling on the conclusion that ".

.

. unquestionably

the effect of the officers' actions was just as damaging as if the evidence
had been known to the police or district attorney and not to the defendsuppression is to be
ant . . .- 316 In the opinion of the court, 8negligent
17
suppression.
unlawful
to
equivalent
as
viewed
The defendant in State of New Mexico v. Rose,118 was convicted of
voluntary manslaughter and appealed. He urged that a suppression of
evidence had occurred because the sheriff and other investigating officers
negligently failed to properly investigate and preserve evidence at the
scene of the crime or to make certain tests or measurements. Specifically, the appellant cited a failure to lift fingerprints from a .22 automatic
belonging to the deceased or to conduct experiments relating to the trajectory of the fatal bullet. The court ruled that this was not the normal suppression of evidence case in stating that, "[iln this case it is the manner
of investigation which is being challenged-not the seizing and subsequent negligent loss or destruction of exculpatory evidence. 8' 19 However, the court went on to excuse the procedures used by the investigators
in this case, having found no evidence of prejudice:
No doubt in this, as in many other investigations, officers later wish they made a
withheld material evidence favorable to the defendant), and People v. Scoglio, 3
Cal. App. 3d 1, 82 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1969) (a failure to look for evidence is quite

different from suppressing known evidence, but in either case the defendant must
demonstrate that he has been prejudiced thereby).
315. 75 N.M. 183, 402 P.2d 162 (1965).
316. Id. at 186, 402 P.2d at 165.
317. Id. at 187, 402 P.2d at 166.
318. 79 N.M. 277, 442 P.2d 589 (1968).
319. Id. at 278, 442 P.2d at 590.
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more complete, detailed investigation. In this instance, the offense having occurred
some forty miles out in the country, the investigation may have fallen short of
"textbook" procedures, but we are not prepared to say on the facts of this case that
3 20
the investigation requires a reversal.
Districtof Columbia

In 1966, the circuit court of appeals for the District of Columbia, in
Levin v. Katzenbach,3 2 1 held that negligent suppression is equivalent to

intentional suppression, stating:
A number of circuits have recently held that the deception that results from negligent nondisclosure is no less damaging than that which is a product of guile and
that such nondisclosure entitles the defendant to relief. We find the reasoning of
such cases persuasive and essential to the fair administration of criminal justice es3 22
pecially in view of the disadvantages facing the accused in the trial process.
However, in United States v. McCord,3 2 3 the court refused to reverse
convictions for assault with a deadly weapon and carrying a dangerous
weapon in an appeal which asserted a suppression of evidence due to the
failure of the police to conduct a fingerprint analysis of the gun in question.

The court found:

We need not reach appellant's contention that this doctrine was violated here by the
failure of the police to conduct a fingerprint analysis of the gun on their own initiative, because appellant himself admitted that he and others had handled the
324
weapon.

Thus, the state of the law as to negligent suppression in the District of Columbia, is at this time uncertain.
USE OF FALSE TESTIMONY OR EVIDENCE BY THE PROSECUTION
INTRODUCTION

The first five sections of this comment have primarily been concerned
with the suppression of evidence by the prosecution, either deliberate or
negligent. This section considers the prosecutor who allows false testimony to be given by a witness or places false evidence before the court or

jury. Attention must necessarily be directed to seeking answers to question such as the following: What duty does a prosecutor have to correct
false testimony? To what degree must this false testimony prejudice the
defendant?
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Are there any cases where the use of false testimony will not

Id. at 278, 442 P.2d at 590.
Supra note 304.
Supra note 304, at 290.
420 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Id. at 258.

19711

COMMENTS

result in a reversal based upon a denial of due process of law? Are there
different criteria when the prosecutor is unaware that the evidence or
325
testimony given is false?
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS

In Mooney v. Holohan,3 26 the Supreme Court held that the acts of the
prosecutor could result in a denial of due process of law. In Mooney's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he set forth evidence which he contended established perjury by the witnesses upon whose testimony he was
convicted and the knowledge of that perjury by the prosecutor. The
Attorney General of California contended that the acts or omissions of
a prosecuting attorney can never, in and by themselves, amount either to
due process of law or a denial of due process of law:
[I]t is only where an act or omission operates so as to deprive a defendant of notice
or so as to deprive him of an opportunity to present such evidence as he has, that it
327
can be said that due process of law has been denied.

The Supreme Court rejected this contention, however, and held in a per
curiam decision:
It is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing
if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is
but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such
a contrivance by a State to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant
is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like
3 28
result by intimidation.

However, leave to file habeas corpus was denied because Mooney had
not exhausted all possible legal remedies.
In two cases originating in Illinois, the Supreme Court further elaborated
upon its decision in Mooney. In Napue v. Illinois,3 29 the petitioner appealed from a conviction of murder. At the trial the principal state witness, who was serving a 199 year sentence for the same act, testified falsely
that he had received no consideration for his testimony. The assistant
state's attorney knew this to be false but allowed the statement to go uncorrected. It was upon these facts that Napue's appeal was grounded.
The case is distinguishible from Mooney in that there the deception went
to a material fact, whereas in Napue the deception went to the credibility
of the witness:
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

There are no cases reported here from the sixth, eighth, or D.C. circuits.
294 U.S. 103 (1935).
Id. at 112.
Id. at 112.
360 U.S. 264 (1959).
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The principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction, implicit in any concept of ordered liberty,
does not cease to apply merely because the false testimony goes only to the credi3
bility of the witnesses. 80

In Miller v. Pate,3 31 an appeal from a murder conviction, the prosecutor
presented as evidence, a pair of men's underwear shorts covered with
large, dark, reddish-brown stains. During the trial, the prosecutor referred
to them as "bloody shorts," and elicited testimony from a chemist of the
state bureau of investigation that the stains were blood. The shorts
were later examined and the stains were found to be, in fact, dried paint.
The Court, finding this to be a deliberate misrepresentation of the truth,
reversed, stating:
More than 30 years ago this Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot

tolerate a state criminal conviction obtained by the knowing use of false evidence.

.. . There has been no deviation from that established principle. .

be no retreat from that principle here. 882

.

. There can

The Court in Nash v. Illinois,33 3 found no denial of due process of law
by the prosecution. Here the petitioner had been convicted of manslaughter on the testimony of an accomplice. The accomplice was promised leniency in exchange for his testimony, but falsely testified that he
had been promised nothing. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction,
but Mr. Justice Fortas, joined by Mr. Justice Warren and Mr. Justice
Douglas dissented, stating:
In any event, it is by no means clear that petitioner must show that the prosecutor's
knowing acquiescence in a material falsehood prejudiced him. There is no place in
our system of criminal justice for prosecutorial misconduct.3 34
INTERPRETATIONS WITHIN THE CIRCUITS

First Circuit
In United States v. De Leo, 335 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled that inconsistencies in a witness's story do not always result in
a denial of due process of law for the defendant. Although it was shown
that an inconsistency existed between a witness's identification as re330. Id. at 269.
331. 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
332. Id. at 7.
333. 389 U.S. 906 (1967).
334. Id. at 907. Another Supreme Court case worth noting is Alcorta v.
Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (fact that prosecutor coached witness to remain silent
of a pertinent fact unless specifically asked amounted to a denial of due process of
law).
335. 422 F.2d 487 (1st Cir. 1970).
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corded in police and F.B.I. reports, the court found no prejudicial error,
explaining:
[We believe that her detailed and substantially accurate description to the F.B.I.
immediately after the robbery . . . . and her positive identification of appellant as
the robber in an uncontested display of photos the day after the robbery completely
dispels any concern with her alleged initial confusion. In light of this and the existence of several other eye witnesses who positively identified appellant as the robber . . . we simply fail to see how appellant's knowledge of this isolated alleged inconsistency could possibly have been material to the resolution of this case. 336

Second Circuit
The New York Court of Appeals utilized strong language in ruling upon
an assertion of prosecutorial misconduct stemming from the use of false
testimony in People v. Savvides.3 37 The defendant had been convicted of possession of marijuana. At the trial, the State's key witness
falsely testified that he had not been promised any consideration in return

for his testimony, and the assistant district attorney allowed this testimony to go uncorrected. The court reversed the conviction, directing itself to whether the falsehood went only to the credibility of the witness:
It is
than
it is
duty

of no consequence that the falsehood bore upon the witness' credibility rather
directly upon defendant's guilt. A lie is a lie, no matter what its subject, and, if
in any way relevant to the case, the district attorney has the responsibility and
to correct what he knows to be false and elicit the truth.33 8

Third Circuit
The Supreme Court of Delaware has ruled that false testimony will
result in a denial of due process only when actual knowledge on the part
of the prosecutor is shown. In O'Neal v. State of Illinois,33 9 two defendants were convicted of robbery and appealed. Originally there were three
defendants, but the State tried only these two while the third testified for
the prosecution. The defendants claimed that this witness's testimony was
false, a fact of which the prosecution was aware. The court concluded:
But there is no showing in the case before us that the prosecutor knew that Pruitt
was lying about his noncomplicity. The prosecutor may have suspected it; indeed, in
his opening statement and summation to the jury, the prosecutor expressed doubts as
to the validity of Pruitt's exculpatory testimony. But there is a significant difference

in this area between opinion and knowledge. The prosecutor was entitled to use
Pruitt's testimony as previously told to the police, his personal beliefs as to Pruitt's
336. Id. at 499.
337. 1 N.Y.2d 554, 136 N.E.2d 853 (1956).
338. Id. at 557, 136 N.E.2d at 854.

339. 247 A.2d 207 (Del. 1968).
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complicity notwithstanding, so long as he did not have actual knowledge to the con-

trary. In the absence of a showing of such knowledge, the convictions are not vul3 40
nerable upon this ground.

In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Snyder,3 4 1 an appeal following a
conviction for manslaughter, the appellant utilized a novel approach by
insisting that the Napue3 42 rule should be applied in reverse. He argued
that ". . . if a witness has in the past given false testimony, then any conviction obtained on the basis of accurate testimony by this witness is
tainted. ' 343 The court dismissed this argument without comment.
In State v. Taylor,344 the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered the
problem presented by a prosecutor who concealed a promise of leniency
to an accomplice when the issue was raised at trial. The court compared
this case to Napue v. Illinois,3 45 and found:
We see no substantial distinction between the failure of the state's attorney in the

Napue case to correct the witness' statement, which he knew personally was not
true, and the affirmative concealment by the assistant prosecutor here of the promise
made by him to recommend leniency for Sullivan in return for his testimony.3 46

Fourth Circuit
Where only a partial truth is revealed when the prosecutor knows the
whole truth, reversible error occurs when the prosecutor makes no attempt to elicit the whole truth. This was the holding in Hamric v. Bailey,847
in which the State called two witnesses who testified that they had not seen
any glass or wood on the decendent's body. A third party, a state policeman, knew of the presence of glass and wood but was not called by the
prosecution as a witness. The presence of the glass and wood would
have tended to show that the decedent was near the defendant's window as
the defendant claimed, and not seventeen feet from the house as the prosecution claimed. The court suggested:
Evidence may be false either because it is perjured, or, though, not itself factually
inaccurate, because it creates a false impression of facts which are known not to

be true. We do not suggest that the testimony of the witnesses in the instant case
was perjured; their mistake may well have been due to their lack of perception, ra-

ther than to a lack of
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

veracity.

3 48

Id. at 210.
427 Pa. 83, 233 A.2d 530 (1967).
Supra note 329 and discussion in text.
Supra note 341, at 95-96, 233 A.2d at 537.
49 N.J. 440, 231 A.2d 212 (1967).
Supra note 329.
Supra note 344, at 453, 231 A.2d at 219-20.
386 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1967).
Id. at 394.
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The court found this case to be analogous to Miller v. Pate, 49 and cited as
improper, the State's calling the two favorable witnesses without also calling the state policeman. The court further held that "[i]t was incumbent
on the prosecutor to adduce the evidence to the contrary on the crucial
fact" 350 of the presence or lack of presence of the glass or wood.
3 51
the defendant was convicted of murIn Jones v. State of Maryland,'
der and robbery and appealed. A co-defendant testified falsely that no
offer was made to him in return for his testimony. The prosecuting attorney testified that he made the offer to the witness's attorney, but that he
honestly believed that the offer had not been communicated to the witness. The court citing the rules on the use of false testimony, reversed
the conviction, stating:
We think the principle under discussion applies to the facts of the instant case and a
prosecutor would be naive, to say the least, if he really believed an attorney could
directly
secure his client's testimony against a co-defendant without in some manner,
52
or indirectly communicating the prosecutor's promise to the witness.

Fifth Circuit
In Smith v. State of Florida,35 3 the defendant, originally charged and
convicted of bank robbery, appealed following a denial by the district
court of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. An accomplice of the
appellant, at a different trial, testified that police officers induced him to
give false testimony at the appellant's trial. The prosecuting attorney
testified that he knew nothing of the false testimony or its suborning. The
Florida court had relied on Austin v. State of Florida," 4 which held that
the prosecuting official had to have knowledge of the perjured testimony
for there to be a denial of due process of law. This court pointed out that
such a narrow interpretation is not warranted. The court citing Pyle v.
Kansas, 5 and Barbee v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 56 which held
that it makes no difference if the suppression is by the prosecutor or by
other public officials, 3 5 returned the case to the district court for further
evidentiary hearings.
349. 386 F.2d 1 (1967).
350. Supra note 347, at 395.
351. 8 Md. App. 405, 260 A.2d 348 (1970).

352. Id. at 414, 260 A.2d at 353.
353. 410 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1969).
354.
355.
356.

160 So. 2d 730 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1964).
317 U.S. 213 (1942).
331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964).

357. Supra note 353, at 1350-51.
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This same District Court of Appeals of Florida, First District refused
to place any special burden on the defense in proving false testimony in
Wolfe v. State of Florida.3' 5s Here, the defendant was convicted of armed
robbery, conspiracy, and larceny. The conviction was based primarily
upon the testimony of an accomplice of the defendant. The accomplice
falsely testified that the only promise he received was that any sentence
he received in connection with this offense would run concurrently with
any possible federal conviction. He failed to state that the bargain included a promise that any sentence he received in a separate, non-connected offense would also run concurrently. The State argued that the defense had the burden to inquire about the presence or extent of any deal
made by the State and that its failure to do so served to waive any objection it may have had to the State's failure to make a full disclosure. The
court rejected this argument and concluded:
Counsel's failure to explore the matter further, whether through ineptness, oversight,
or the belief that further pursuit of the subject was unnecessary, should not be held
to constitute a waiver of appellant's right to a fair and impartial trial in accordance
35 9
with due process of law.

In Miller v. State of Mississippi,360 the defendant was convicted of

attempted kidnapping and appealed. One of the co-conspirators testified
as to the facts of the crime. The State's Attorney asked the witness a
question which resulted in an answer which was both partially true and
partially false. The court ruled that because the defense had initiated the
line of questioning and that the prosecutor was merely following it though,
there could be no error:
The issue thus presented is whether the leading and suggestive question propounded
by the State's attorney wherein he suggested that the witness "came down and made
bond" is the equivalent of using false testimony with knowledge of its falsity to aid in
procuring a conviction and which was condemned in Napue. We are of the opinion that the issue must be answered in the negative since it was not initiated by the
State's attorney and there is nothing to indicate knowledge on his part of its falsity
nor is there any indication that its use was deliberately made to deceive the jury. 36 1

Seventh Circuit

The courts of Illinois have considered three separate cases regarding
the use of false testimony by the prosecution. In the first, People v. La358.
359.
360.
361.
(use of

190 So. 2d 394 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1966).
Id. at 397.
234 So. 2d 297 (Miss. 1970).
Id. at 302. See Bogan v. State, 211 So. 2d 74 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1968)
false testimony by the State is a recognized ground for relief).
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gios,36 2 the Supreme Court of Illinois considered whether conflicts in a
witness's testimony amount to a denial of due process of law. The defendant, convicted of robbery, appealed, contending there was a knowing
use of perjured testimony by the prosecution. The witness in question had
given conflicting testimony which led the petitioner to claim that the testimony had been perjured. The court discussed this question:
The knowing use of false or perjured testimony by the prosecutor to procure a conviction constitutes, of course, a denial of due process (citations omitted). However, mere conflicts in the testimony of the witness with his prior statements or with
other evidence does not establish that he has perjured himself. . . . The testimony
of this witness does not suggest deliberate false statements made with intent to mislead and certainly does not indicate participation in perjury by the prosecution.363

In People v. Smith,3 6 4 the Supreme Court of Illinois considered whether
a police informer was under the same obligations as the police department.
In this case, the defendants were convicted of unlawful sale of narcotic
drugs. A police informer, who was a narcotics addict, testified for the
State. The defendants later proved that the informer gave false testimony concerning his credibility, but there was no proof that the State
knew the informer had given any misinformation. The defendants relied
upon Barbee v. Maryland365 and argued that the rationale of Barbee
(state responsibility for false statements of the police) should be extended
to cover false statements by an informer. The court held:
The only allegation defendants make in this connection is that the State should be
held to have constructive knowledge of the witness's veracity and be responsible for
the false statements of informers-just as it would be for false statements uttered
by a police officer. Such conclusion is without precedent and we do not adopt it.
An informer-addict does not enjoy the same credibility as a police officer and the
Barbee theory does not apply.8

66

The Illinois Appellate Court discussed prosecution coaching of witnesses
in People v. McGuirk.367 The defendant had been convicted of raping a nine year old girl and appealed on the ground that the prosecutor
had told the prosecutrix what to say in court. On re-examination, the
prosecutrix testified that the prosecutor had told her "some to say" and
that the man to be identified was sitting at the table. The court discussed
two points: (1) the propriety of discussing testimony with a witness, and
(2) the propriety of the inducement of testimony. As to the first point,
the court stated, in part:
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

39 Ill. 2d 298, 235 N.E.2d 587 (1968).
Id. at 301, 235 N.E.2d at 588-89.
41111. 2d 158, 242 N.E.2d 198 (1968).
Supra note 356.
Supra note 364, at 163-64, 242 N.E.2d at 201.
106 Ill. App. 2d 266, 245 N.E.2d 917 (1969).
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inhere is nothing improper in refreshing their memory before they take the stand.
Reviewing their testimony before trial makes for better direct examination, facilitates
the trial and lessens the possibility of irrelevant and perhaps prejudicial interpolations. It is particularly advisable in a sex case to prepare a prosecutrix for the ordeal she will face in the court room ....
There is nothing wrong with this if the
witness' essential testimony is neither altered nor colored by emphasis or sugges3 8
ion. 6
As to the second point, the court added that "[it is highly improper for
a prosecutor to induce a witness to say anything but the truth and it is a
denial of due process for a conviction to be obtained on testimony known
by the prosecution to be false." ' 3069 The court, however, noted that what
the prosecutor told the child to say was not on the record, that the prosecutrix knew the defendant, a janitor in her building, and that there was
nothing improper about telling her that he would be seated at any particu370
lar table.
Ninth Circuit

In Imbler v. Craven,3 71 the United States District Court for the Central
District of California, discussed the prosecution's use of highly questionable testimony. In this habeas corpus proceeding, the petitioner, who was
earlier found guilty of murder and other crimes, claimed that the convic-

tion was secured by the use of false testimony and requested a new trial.
The court ruled that to secure a new trial, knowledge of the false evidence
by the prosecutor must be shown: "Thus the current law in this Circuit
• . . is that 'knowledge' by the prosecution is required to support a claim
of denial of due process based upon the existence of prejudicial perjured
testimony in a criminal trial."'3 72 The court then spoke of the legal conse-

quences of the reckless use by the prosecutor of highly suspicious testimony:
While the prosecutor claimed not to have disbelieved these outright lies, he clearly
had cause to suspect them. The reckless use of highly suspicious false testimony is
no less damaging or culpable than the knowing use of false testimony, and a convic8 73
tion based upon such evidence must suffer the same consequence.
368. Id. at 276, 245 N.E.2d at 922.
369. Id. at 276, 245 N.E.2d at 922.
370. Other seventh circuit cases on point include: People v. Rose, supra note
210; (inconsistencies are not equated with a showing of false testimony); People v.
Harris, 105 Ill. App. 2d 305, 245 N.E.2d 80 (1969) (where there has been no
deal communicated, subsequent favors to a witness are not proof of an inducement
to testify); and United States v. Bishop, 188 F. Supp. 804 (1960) (false statements of witness in regard to favors in return for testimony necessitated a reversal).
371. 298 F. Supp. 795 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
372. Id. at 805.
373. Id. at 807-08.
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In Long v. United States,' 7 4 the appellant was convicted of narcotics
violations and appealed. One point of his appeal was that the Government knowingly used perjured testimony to bring about his conviction.
The court outlined the necessary criteria for proving the alleged facts by
the appellant: "An outline of specific facts is necessary to support an allegation that the Government knowingly used perjured or tainted testimony."'37 5 The court then concluded that the appellant had failed to state
his cause correctly and affirmed the conviction.
The Supreme Court of Nevada has held that one must show knowledge
by the prosecution of false testimony before a reversal may be had. In
Hanley v. Sheriff of Clark County,37 6 an appeal from a denial of a writ of
habeas corpus, a prosecution witness stated after the trial that all his prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing was false. The court cited a series of
cases concerning the knowing use of false evidence or testimony. However, the court first pointed out that in the instant case the record did not
established knowledge on the part of the prosecution and, in affirming
stated:
One cannot discern whether he told the truth originally or later. In any event,
there is nothing in the record from the prosecution to show that it knowingly offered false testimony.

Such evidence was present in the cited United States Supreme

Court cases. We shall not infer such knowledge in the prosecution from the testi377
mony of the recanting witness alone.

Tenth Circuit

In Kostal v. People,378 the defendant appealed the denial of his motion to vacate judgment. The basis for his appeal was that the prosecutor
used false evidence to obtain his conviction, namely, an expended cartridge case, with reference made to Miller v. Pate.8 79 The defendant conceded that he believed the district attorney acted in good faith. The court
distinguished this case from Miller because: "In that case it was made to
appear that the prosecution deliberately misrepresented the truth and obtained a conviction by the knowing use of false evidence. ' 38 0 Since the
defendant did not allege a knowing or deliberate misrepresentation, and in
fact, conceded the good faith of the district attorney, the court ruled there
could be no reversal of the earlier conviction and affirmed.
374. 422 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1970).
375. Id. at 1026.
376. 85 Nev. 615, 460 P.2d 162 (1969).
377. Id. at 617, 460 P.2d at 163.
378. 167 Colo. 317, 447 P.2d 536 (1968).
379. Supra note 349.
380. Supra note 378, at 319, 447 P.2d at 537.
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In Rodgers v. State of Kansas,3 8 1 the Supreme Court of Kansas agreed
that the use of false testimony by the prosecution without an attempt to
correct that testimony, would amount to a violation of due process of law.
The court, in referring to the allegations of the defendant who argued
that the prosecution used false testimony and failed to correct that testimony, stated that, "[i]f all of the facts alleged in the motion are true the
movant might have been deprived of due process in violation of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution .... ,,382 However, the
court found that the evidence presented a clear showing that there was no
use of false testimony and affirmed the earlier conviction.
CONCLUSION

Generalization from a survey such as this is difficult due to the absence of specific requirements and guidelines provided by the higher courts.
It is clear, however, that boundaries, while vague and ill-defined, have
been established to prevent a denial of due process of law stemming from
the acts or omissions of the prosecution. Until more specific guidelines
are provided,38 3 the prosecutor or defense attorney must refer to the decisions of the particular jurisdiction involved, bearing in mind the general
guidelines established by Mooney, Giles, and Brady. Such is the only
valid conclusion which may be drawn in an area which is developing in an
atmosphere of everchanging ideologies and interpretations.
CharlesA ron

381. 201 Kan. 766, 443 P.2d 252 (1968).
382. Id. at 766, 443 P.2d at 253.
383. This field will be more clearly delineated when the United States Supreme
Court rules on the pending case of Moore v. Illinois, 42 I11.
2d 73, 246 N.E.2d 299
(1970), cert. granted, 402 U.S. 91 (1971). The Court will be given the opportunity

to determine whether a police agency's non-disclosure may be charged to the prosecution.
Recently, the Supreme Court has clarified the obligation of the prosecutor, holding
that the failure by the trial attorney to disclose an Assistant United States Attorney's
promise not to prosecute a key witness was material to the credibility of the witness, and therefore reversible error--even though the trial attorney had no knowledge of the promise. Giglio v. United States, 40 U.S.L.W. 4209 (Feb. 24, 1972).

